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[syzkaller] INFO: rcu detected stall in ip_rcv #32
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Even with the change that adds |
Repro'd on top of:
|
Still no clue here. What I observe: When the issue/race is triggered, at mptcp_close() time an MPTCP listener socket is 'hashed' (that is !!sk_node.pprev, supposedly inserted into the token container), but can't be found into the relevant bucket. The previous listen() call completed with the mentioned socket being correctly 'unhashed'. No idea who/how flipped sk_node.pprev meanwhile |
Can't repro anymore with HEAD: e7d05321339a ("add mptcp_token_destroy") (HEAD) (11 seconds ago) |
Closing as it does not reproduce anymore. |
In case the qdisc_match_from_root function() is called from non-rcu path with rtnl mutex held, a suspiciout rcu usage warning appears: [ 241.504354] ============================= [ 241.504358] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 241.504366] 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g72a7c7d549c3 #32 Not tainted [ 241.504370] ----------------------------- [ 241.504378] net/sched/sch_api.c:270 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 241.504382] other info that might help us debug this: [ 241.504388] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 241.504394] 1 lock held by tc/1391: [ 241.504398] #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49a/0xbd0 [ 241.504431] stack backtrace: [ 241.504440] CPU: 0 PID: 1391 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g72a7c7d549c3 #32 [ 241.504446] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 [ 241.504453] Call Trace: [ 241.504465] dump_stack+0x100/0x184 [ 241.504482] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d [ 241.504499] qdisc_match_from_root+0x293/0x350 Fix this by passing the rtnl held lockdep condition down to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When the dwc2 platform device is removed, it unregisters the generic phy. usb_remove_phy() is called and the dwc2 usb_phy is removed from the "phy_list", but the uevent may still attempt to get the usb_phy from the list, resulting in a page fault bug. Currently we can't access the usb_phy from the "phy_list" after the device is removed. As a fix check to make sure that we can get the usb_phy before moving forward with the uevent. [ 84.949345] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address:00000007935688d8 [ 84.949349] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 84.949351] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 84.949353] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 84.949356] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 84.949360] CPU: 2 PID: 2081 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-snps-16547-ga8534cb092d7-dirty #32 [ 84.949363] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Z400 Workstation/0B4Ch, BIOS 786G3 v03.54 11/02/2011 [ 84.949365] RIP: 0010:usb_phy_uevent+0x99/0x121 [ 84.949372] Code: 8d 83 f8 00 00 00 48 3d b0 12 22 94 74 05 4c 3b 23 75 5b 8b 83 9c 00 00 00 be 32 00 00 00 48 8d 7c 24 04 48 c7 c2 d4 5d 7b 93 <48> 8b 0c c5 e0 88 56 93 e8 0f 63 8a ff 8b 83 98 00 00 00 be 32 00 [ 84.949375] RSP: 0018:ffffa46bc0f2fc70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 84.949378] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffffffff942211b8 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ 84.949380] RDX: ffffffff937b5dd4 RSI: 0000000000000032 RDI: ffffa46bc0f2fc74 [ 84.949383] RBP: ffff94a306613000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000fffeffff [ 84.949385] R10: ffffa46bc0f2faa8 R11: ffffa46bc0f2faa0 R12: ffff94a30186d410 [ 84.949387] R13: ffff94a32d188a80 R14: ffff94a30029f960 R15: ffffffff93522dd0 [ 84.949389] FS: 00007efdbd417540(0000) GS:ffff94a513a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 84.949392] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 84.949394] CR2: 00000007935688d8 CR3: 0000000165606000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 84.949396] Call Trace: [ 84.949401] dev_uevent+0x190/0x1ad [ 84.949408] kobject_uevent_env+0x18e/0x46c [ 84.949414] device_release_driver_internal+0x17f/0x18e [ 84.949418] bus_remove_device+0xd3/0xe5 [ 84.949421] device_del+0x1c3/0x31d [ 84.949425] ? kobject_put+0x97/0xa8 [ 84.949428] platform_device_del+0x1c/0x63 [ 84.949432] platform_device_unregister+0xa/0x11 [ 84.949436] dwc2_pci_remove+0x1e/0x2c [dwc2_pci] [ 84.949440] pci_device_remove+0x31/0x81 [ 84.949445] device_release_driver_internal+0xea/0x18e [ 84.949448] driver_detach+0x68/0x72 [ 84.949450] bus_remove_driver+0x63/0x82 [ 84.949453] pci_unregister_driver+0x1a/0x75 [ 84.949457] __do_sys_delete_module+0x149/0x1e9 [ 84.949462] ? task_work_run+0x64/0x6e [ 84.949465] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xd4/0x10d [ 84.949471] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x70 [ 84.949475] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 84.949480] RIP: 0033:0x7efdbd563bcb [ 84.949482] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c5 82 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 95 82 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 84.949485] RSP: 002b:00007ffe944d7d98 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 [ 84.949489] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005651072eb700 RCX: 00007efdbd563bcb [ 84.949491] RDX: 000000000000000a RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005651072eb768 [ 84.949493] RBP: 00007ffe944d7df8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 84.949495] R10: 00007efdbd5dfac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe944d7fd0 [ 84.949497] R13: 00007ffe944d8610 R14: 00005651072eb2a0 R15: 00005651072eb700 [ 84.949500] Modules linked in: uas configfs dwc2_pci(-) phy_generic fuse crc32c_intel [last unloaded: udc_core] [ 84.949508] CR2: 00000007935688d8 [ 84.949510] ---[ end trace e40c871ca3e4dc9e ]--- [ 84.949512] RIP: 0010:usb_phy_uevent+0x99/0x121 Fixes: a8534cb ("usb: phy: introduce usb_phy device type with its own uevent handler") Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artur Petrosyan <Arthur.Petrosyan@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210710092247.D7AFEA005D@mailhost.synopsys.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The following error is reported when running "./test_progs -t for_each" under arm64: bpf_jit: multi-func JIT bug 58 != 56 [...] JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls The root cause is the size of BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC instruction increases from 2 to 3 after the address of called bpf-function is settled and there are two bpf-to-bpf calls in test_pkt_access. The generated instructions are shown below: 0x48: 21 00 C0 D2 movz x1, #0x1, lsl #32 0x4c: 21 00 80 F2 movk x1, #0x1 0x48: E1 3F C0 92 movn x1, #0x1ff, lsl #32 0x4c: 41 FE A2 F2 movk x1, #0x17f2, lsl #16 0x50: 81 70 9F F2 movk x1, #0xfb84 Fixing it by using emit_addr_mov_i64() for BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC, so the size of jited image will not change. Fixes: 69c087b ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211231151018.3781550-1-houtao1@huawei.com
Rafael reports that on a system with LX2160A and Marvell DSA switches, if a reboot occurs while the DSA master (dpaa2-eth) is up, the following panic can be seen: systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00a0000800000041 [00a0000800000041] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00042-g8f5585009b24 #32 pc : dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4 lr : raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c Call trace: dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x54/0xa0 __dev_close_many+0x50/0x130 dev_close_many+0x84/0x120 unregister_netdevice_many+0x130/0x710 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x8c/0xd0 unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30 dpaa2_eth_remove+0x68/0x190 fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c __device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220 device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0 device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100 __device_release_driver+0x94/0x220 device_release_driver+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 device_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40 __fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20 device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0 dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0 fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c __device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220 device_release_driver+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 device_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100 fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30 device_shutdown+0x154/0x330 __do_sys_reboot+0x1cc/0x250 __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150 el0_svc+0x24/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0 el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c It can be seen from the stack trace that the problem is that the deregistration of the master causes a dev_close(), which gets notified as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN to dsa_slave_netdevice_event(). But dsa_switch_shutdown() has already run, and this has unregistered the DSA slave interfaces, and yet, the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler attempts to call dev_close_many() on those slave interfaces, leading to the problem. The previous attempt to avoid the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN on the master after dsa_switch_shutdown() was called seems improper. Unregistering the slave interfaces is unnecessary and unhelpful. Instead, after the slaves have stopped being uppers of the DSA master, we can now reset to NULL the master->dsa_ptr pointer, which will make DSA start ignoring all future notifier events on the master. Fixes: 0650bf5 ("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown") Reported-by: Rafael Richter <rafael.richter@gin.de> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The BPF STX/LDX instruction uses offset relative to the FP to address stack space. Since the BPF_FP locates at the top of the frame, the offset is usually a negative number. However, arm64 str/ldr immediate instruction requires that offset be a positive number. Therefore, this patch tries to convert the offsets. The method is to find the negative offset furthest from the FP firstly. Then add it to the FP, calculate a bottom position, called FPB, and then adjust the offsets in other STR/LDX instructions relative to FPB. FPB is saved using the callee-saved register x27 of arm64 which is not used yet. Before adjusting the offset, the patch checks every instruction to ensure that the FP does not change in run-time. If the FP may change, no offset is adjusted. For example, for the following bpftrace command: bpftrace -e 'kprobe:do_sys_open { printf("opening: %s\n", str(arg1)); }' Without this patch, jited code(fragment): 0: bti c 4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 8: mov x29, sp c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 18: mov x25, sp 1c: mov x26, #0x0 // #0 20: bti j 24: sub sp, sp, #0x90 28: add x19, x0, #0x0 2c: mov x0, #0x0 // #0 30: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff78 // #-136 34: str x0, [x25, x10] 38: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff80 // #-128 3c: str x0, [x25, x10] 40: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff88 // #-120 44: str x0, [x25, x10] 48: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff90 // #-112 4c: str x0, [x25, x10] 50: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff98 // #-104 54: str x0, [x25, x10] 58: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa0 // #-96 5c: str x0, [x25, x10] 60: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa8 // #-88 64: str x0, [x25, x10] 68: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb0 // #-80 6c: str x0, [x25, x10] 70: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb8 // #-72 74: str x0, [x25, x10] 78: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc0 // #-64 7c: str x0, [x25, x10] 80: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc8 // #-56 84: str x0, [x25, x10] 88: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd0 // #-48 8c: str x0, [x25, x10] 90: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40 94: str x0, [x25, x10] 98: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe0 // #-32 9c: str x0, [x25, x10] a0: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe8 // #-24 a4: str x0, [x25, x10] a8: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff0 // #-16 ac: str x0, [x25, x10] b0: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff8 // #-8 b4: str x0, [x25, x10] b8: mov x10, #0x8 // #8 bc: ldr x2, [x19, x10] [...] With this patch, jited code(fragment): 0: bti c 4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 8: mov x29, sp c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 1c: mov x25, sp 20: sub x27, x25, #0x88 24: mov x26, #0x0 // #0 28: bti j 2c: sub sp, sp, #0x90 30: add x19, x0, #0x0 34: mov x0, #0x0 // #0 38: str x0, [x27] 3c: str x0, [x27, #8] 40: str x0, [x27, #16] 44: str x0, [x27, #24] 48: str x0, [x27, #32] 4c: str x0, [x27, #40] 50: str x0, [x27, #48] 54: str x0, [x27, #56] 58: str x0, [x27, #64] 5c: str x0, [x27, #72] 60: str x0, [x27, #80] 64: str x0, [x27, #88] 68: str x0, [x27, #96] 6c: str x0, [x27, #104] 70: str x0, [x27, #112] 74: str x0, [x27, #120] 78: str x0, [x27, #128] 7c: ldr x2, [x19, #8] [...] Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220321152852.2334294-4-xukuohai@huawei.com
This commit adds python script to parse CoreSight tracing event and print out source line and disassembly, it generates readable program execution flow for easier humans inspecting. The script receives CoreSight tracing packet with below format: +------------+------------+------------+ packet(n): | addr | ip | cpu | +------------+------------+------------+ packet(n+1): | addr | ip | cpu | +------------+------------+------------+ packet::addr presents the start address of the coming branch sample, and packet::ip is the last address of the branch smple. Therefore, a code section between branches starts from packet(n)::addr and it stops at packet(n+1)::ip. As results we combines the two continuous packets to generate the address range for instructions: [ sample(n)::addr .. sample(n+1)::ip ] The script supports both objdump or llvm-objdump for disassembly with specifying option '-d'. If doesn't specify option '-d', the script simply outputs source lines and symbols. Below shows usages with llvm-objdump or objdump to output disassembly. # perf script -s scripts/python/arm-cs-trace-disasm.py -- -d llvm-objdump-11 -k ./vmlinux ARM CoreSight Trace Data Assembler Dump ffff800008eb3198 <etm4_enable_hw>: ffff800008eb3310: c0 38 00 35 cbnz w0, 0xffff800008eb3a28 <etm4_enable_hw+0x890> ffff800008eb3314: 9f 3f 03 d5 dsb sy ffff800008eb3318: df 3f 03 d5 isb ffff800008eb331c: f5 5b 42 a9 ldp x21, x22, [sp, #32] ffff800008eb3320: fb 73 45 a9 ldp x27, x28, [sp, #80] ffff800008eb3324: e0 82 40 39 ldrb w0, [x23, #32] ffff800008eb3328: 60 00 00 34 cbz w0, 0xffff800008eb3334 <etm4_enable_hw+0x19c> ffff800008eb332c: e0 03 19 aa mov x0, x25 ffff800008eb3330: 8c fe ff 97 bl 0xffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0> main 6728/6728 [0004] 0.000000000 etm4_enable_hw+0x198 [kernel.kallsyms] ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>: ffff800008eb2d60: 1f 20 03 d5 nop ffff800008eb2d64: 1f 20 03 d5 nop ffff800008eb2d68: 3f 23 03 d5 hint #25 ffff800008eb2d6c: 00 00 40 f9 ldr x0, [x0] ffff800008eb2d70: 9f 3f 03 d5 dsb sy ffff800008eb2d74: 00 c0 3e 91 add x0, x0, #4016 ffff800008eb2d78: 1f 00 00 b9 str wzr, [x0] ffff800008eb2d7c: bf 23 03 d5 hint #29 ffff800008eb2d80: c0 03 5f d6 ret main 6728/6728 [0004] 0.000000000 etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0+0x20 # perf script -s scripts/python/arm-cs-trace-disasm.py -- -d objdump -k ./vmlinux ARM CoreSight Trace Data Assembler Dump ffff800008eb3310 <etm4_enable_hw+0x178>: ffff800008eb3310: 350038c0 cbnz w0, ffff800008eb3a28 <etm4_enable_hw+0x890> ffff800008eb3314: d5033f9f dsb sy ffff800008eb3318: d5033fdf isb ffff800008eb331c: a9425bf5 ldp x21, x22, [sp, #32] ffff800008eb3320: a94573fb ldp x27, x28, [sp, #80] ffff800008eb3324: 394082e0 ldrb w0, [x23, #32] ffff800008eb3328: 34000060 cbz w0, ffff800008eb3334 <etm4_enable_hw+0x19c> ffff800008eb332c: aa1903e0 mov x0, x25 ffff800008eb3330: 97fffe8c bl ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0> main 6728/6728 [0004] 0.000000000 etm4_enable_hw+0x198 [kernel.kallsyms] ffff800008eb2d60 <etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0>: ffff800008eb2d60: d503201f nop ffff800008eb2d64: d503201f nop ffff800008eb2d68: d503233f paciasp ffff800008eb2d6c: f9400000 ldr x0, [x0] ffff800008eb2d70: d5033f9f dsb sy ffff800008eb2d74: 913ec000 add x0, x0, #0xfb0 ffff800008eb2d78: b900001f str wzr, [x0] ffff800008eb2d7c: d50323bf autiasp ffff800008eb2d80: d65f03c0 ret main 6728/6728 [0004] 0.000000000 etm4_cs_lock.isra.0.part.0+0x20 Signed-off-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Co-authored-by: Al Grant <al.grant@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Co-authored-by: Tor Jeremiassen <tor@ti.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Cc: German Gomez <german.gomez@arm.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Cc: Tanmay Jagdale <tanmay@marvell.com> Cc: coresight@lists.linaro.org Cc: zengshun . wu <zengshun.wu@outlook.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521130446.4163597-3-leo.yan@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Today doing a BPF tail call after a BPF to BPF call, that is from a subprogram, is allowed only by the x86-64 BPF JIT. Mixing these features requires support from JIT. Tail call count has to be tracked through BPF to BPF calls, as well as through BPF tail calls to prevent unbounded chains of tail calls. arm64 BPF JIT stores the tail call count (TCC) in a dedicated register (X26). This makes it easier to support bpf2bpf calls mixed with tail calls than on x86 platform. In order to keep the tail call count in tact throughout bpf2bpf calls, all we need to do is tweak the program prologue generator. When emitting prologue for a subprogram, we skip the block that initializes the tail call count and emits a jump pad for the tail call. With this change, a sample execution flow where a bpf2bpf call is followed by a tail call would look like so: int entry(struct __sk_buff *skb): 0xffffffc0090151d4: paciasp 0xffffffc0090151d8: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 0xffffffc0090151dc: mov x29, sp 0xffffffc0090151e0: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 0xffffffc0090151e4: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 0xffffffc0090151e8: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 0xffffffc0090151ec: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 0xffffffc0090151f0: mov x25, sp 0xffffffc0090151f4: mov x26, #0x0 // <- init TCC only 0xffffffc0090151f8: bti j // in main prog 0xffffffc0090151fc: sub x27, x25, #0x0 0xffffffc009015200: sub sp, sp, #0x10 0xffffffc009015204: mov w1, #0x0 0xffffffc009015208: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffc00901520c: strb w1, [x25, x10] 0xffffffc009015210: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffd25c 0xffffffc009015214: movk x10, #0x902, lsl #16 0xffffffc009015218: movk x10, #0xffc0, lsl #32 0xffffffc00901521c: blr x10 -------------------. // bpf2bpf call 0xffffffc009015220: add x7, x0, #0x0 <-------------. 0xffffffc009015224: add sp, sp, #0x10 | | 0xffffffc009015228: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00901522c: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc009015230: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc009015234: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc009015238: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00901523c: add x0, x7, #0x0 | | 0xffffffc009015240: autiasp | | 0xffffffc009015244: ret | | | | int subprog_tail(struct __sk_buff *skb): | | 0xffffffc00902d25c: paciasp <----------------------' | 0xffffffc00902d260: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | 0xffffffc00902d264: mov x29, sp | 0xffffffc00902d268: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! | 0xffffffc00902d26c: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! | 0xffffffc00902d270: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! | 0xffffffc00902d274: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! | 0xffffffc00902d278: mov x25, sp | 0xffffffc00902d27c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 | 0xffffffc00902d280: sub sp, sp, #0x10 | // <- end of prologue, notice: 0xffffffc00902d284: add x19, x0, #0x0 | // 1) TCC not touched, and 0xffffffc00902d288: mov w0, #0x1 | // 2) no tail call jump pad 0xffffffc00902d28c: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffffc | 0xffffffc00902d290: str w0, [x25, x10] | 0xffffffc00902d294: mov x20, #0xffffff80ffffffff | 0xffffffc00902d298: movk x20, #0xc033, lsl #16 | 0xffffffc00902d29c: movk x20, #0x4e00 | 0xffffffc00902d2a0: add x0, x19, #0x0 | 0xffffffc00902d2a4: add x1, x20, #0x0 | 0xffffffc00902d2a8: mov x2, #0x0 | 0xffffffc00902d2ac: mov w10, #0x24 | 0xffffffc00902d2b0: ldr w10, [x1, x10] | 0xffffffc00902d2b4: add w2, w2, #0x0 | 0xffffffc00902d2b8: cmp w2, w10 | 0xffffffc00902d2bc: b.cs 0xffffffc00902d2f8 | 0xffffffc00902d2c0: mov w10, #0x21 | 0xffffffc00902d2c4: cmp x26, x10 | // TCC >= MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT? 0xffffffc00902d2c8: b.cs 0xffffffc00902d2f8 | 0xffffffc00902d2cc: add x26, x26, #0x1 | // TCC++ 0xffffffc00902d2d0: mov w10, #0x110 | 0xffffffc00902d2d4: add x10, x1, x10 | 0xffffffc00902d2d8: lsl x11, x2, #3 | 0xffffffc00902d2dc: ldr x11, [x10, x11] | 0xffffffc00902d2e0: cbz x11, 0xffffffc00902d2f8 | 0xffffffc00902d2e4: mov w10, #0x30 | 0xffffffc00902d2e8: ldr x10, [x11, x10] | 0xffffffc00902d2ec: add x10, x10, #0x24 | 0xffffffc00902d2f0: add sp, sp, #0x10 | // <- destroy just current 0xffffffc00902d2f4: br x10 ---------------------. | // BPF stack frame 0xffffffc00902d2f8: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffffc | | // before the tail call 0xffffffc00902d2fc: ldr w7, [x25, x10] | | 0xffffffc00902d300: add sp, sp, #0x10 | | 0xffffffc00902d304: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00902d308: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00902d30c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00902d310: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00902d314: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | | 0xffffffc00902d318: add x0, x7, #0x0 | | 0xffffffc00902d31c: autiasp | | 0xffffffc00902d320: ret | | | | int classifier_0(struct __sk_buff *skb): | | 0xffffffc008ff5874: paciasp | | 0xffffffc008ff5878: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! | | 0xffffffc008ff587c: mov x29, sp | | 0xffffffc008ff5880: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! | | 0xffffffc008ff5884: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! | | 0xffffffc008ff5888: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! | | 0xffffffc008ff588c: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! | | 0xffffffc008ff5890: mov x25, sp | | 0xffffffc008ff5894: mov x26, #0x0 | | 0xffffffc008ff5898: bti j <----------------------' | 0xffffffc008ff589c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 | 0xffffffc008ff58a0: sub sp, sp, #0x0 | 0xffffffc008ff58a4: mov x0, #0xffffffc0ffffffff | 0xffffffc008ff58a8: movk x0, #0x8fc, lsl #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58ac: movk x0, #0x6000 | 0xffffffc008ff58b0: mov w1, #0x1 | 0xffffffc008ff58b4: str w1, [x0] | 0xffffffc008ff58b8: mov w7, #0x0 | 0xffffffc008ff58bc: mov sp, sp | 0xffffffc008ff58c0: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58c4: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58c8: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58cc: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58d0: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 | 0xffffffc008ff58d4: add x0, x7, #0x0 | 0xffffffc008ff58d8: autiasp | 0xffffffc008ff58dc: ret -------------------------------' Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220617105735.733938-3-jakub@cloudflare.com
By keep sending L2CAP_CONF_REQ packets, chan->num_conf_rsp increases multiple times and eventually it will wrap around the maximum number (i.e., 255). This patch prevents this by adding a boundary check with L2CAP_MAX_CONF_RSP Btmon log: Bluetooth monitor ver 5.64 = Note: Linux version 6.1.0-rc2 (x86_64) 0.264594 = Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22 0.264636 @ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.22 {0x0001} 0.272191 = New Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (Primary,Virtual,hci0) [hci0] 13.877604 @ RAW Open: 9496 (privileged) version 2.22 {0x0002} 13.890741 = Open Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00 [hci0] 13.900426 (...) > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033 #32 [hci0] 14.273106 invalid packet size (12 != 1033) 08 00 01 00 02 01 04 00 01 10 ff ff ............ > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1547 #33 [hci0] 14.273561 invalid packet size (14 != 1547) 0a 00 01 00 04 01 06 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 ........@..... > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061 #34 [hci0] 14.274390 invalid packet size (16 != 2061) 0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 ........@....... > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061 #35 [hci0] 14.274932 invalid packet size (16 != 2061) 0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 07 00 03 00 ........@....... = bluetoothd: Bluetooth daemon 5.43 14.401828 > ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033 #36 [hci0] 14.275753 invalid packet size (12 != 1033) 08 00 01 00 04 01 04 00 40 00 00 00 ........@... Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
The conclusion "j1939_session_deactivate() should be called with a session ref-count of at least 2" is incorrect. In some concurrent scenarios, j1939_session_deactivate can be called with the session ref-count less than 2. But there is not any problem because it will check the session active state before session putting in j1939_session_deactivate_locked(). Here is the concurrent scenario of the problem reported by syzbot and my reproduction log. cpu0 cpu1 j1939_xtp_rx_eoma j1939_xtp_rx_abort_one j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 2] j1939_session_get_by_addr [kref == 3] j1939_session_deactivate [kref == 2] j1939_session_put [kref == 1] j1939_session_completed j1939_session_deactivate WARN_ON_ONCE(kref < 2) ===================================================== WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at net/can/j1939/transport.c:1088 j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70 CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:j1939_session_deactivate+0x5f/0x70 Call Trace: j1939_session_deactivate_activate_next+0x11/0x28 j1939_xtp_rx_eoma+0x12a/0x180 j1939_tp_recv+0x4a2/0x510 j1939_can_recv+0x226/0x380 can_rcv_filter+0xf8/0x220 can_receive+0x102/0x220 ? process_backlog+0xf0/0x2c0 can_rcv+0x53/0xf0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x67/0x90 ? process_backlog+0x97/0x2c0 __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x80 Fixes: 0c71437 ("can: j1939: j1939_session_deactivate(): clarify lifetime of session object") Reported-by: syzbot+9981a614060dcee6eeca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210906094200.95868-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
If an abnormally huge cnt is used for multi-uprobes attachment, the following warning will be reported: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 406 at mm/util.c:632 kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O) CPU: 7 PID: 406 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ...... 6.7.0-rc3+ #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x89/0x150 ? kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach+0x14a/0x480 __sys_bpf+0x14a9/0x2bc0 do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 ...... </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- So add a test to ensure the warning is fixed. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231215100708.2265609-4-houtao@huaweicloud.com
If an abnormally huge cnt is used for multi-kprobes attachment, the following warning will be reported: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 392 at mm/util.c:632 kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O) CPU: 1 PID: 392 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ...... 6.7.0-rc3+ #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 ? __warn+0x89/0x150 ? kvmalloc_node+0xd9/0xe0 bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach+0x87/0x670 __sys_bpf+0x2a28/0x2bc0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7fbe067f0e0d ...... </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- So add a test to ensure the warning is fixed. Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231215100708.2265609-6-houtao@huaweicloud.com
When I use older version aarch64 objdump (2.24) to disassemble aarch64 vmlinux, I get the result like below. There is no space between sp and offset. ffff800008010000 <dw_apb_ictl_handle_irq>: ffff800008010000: d503233f hint #0x19 ffff800008010004: a9bc7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp,#-64]! ffff800008010008: 90011e60 adrp x0, ffff80000a3dc000 <num_ictlrs> ffff80000801000c: 910003fd mov x29, sp ffff800008010010: a9025bf5 stp x21, x22, [sp,#32] When I use newer version aarch64 objdump (2.35), I get the result like below. There is a space between sp and offset. ffff800008010000 <dw_apb_ictl_handle_irq>: ffff800008010000: d503233f paciasp ffff800008010004: a9bc7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-64]! ffff800008010008: 90011e60 adrp x0, ffff80000a3dc000 <num_ictlrs> ffff80000801000c: 910003fd mov x29, sp ffff800008010010: a9025bf5 stp x21, x22, [sp, #32] Add no space support of regular expression for old version objdump. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231220073629.2658-1-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com> Cc: Casper Li <casper.li@mediatek.com> Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Qun-Wei Lin <qun-wei.lin@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
------------[ cut here ]------------ memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8 R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80 FS: 00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib] ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0 ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0 __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580 __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50 ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370 ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib] neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110 ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480 ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0 __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190 ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0 ip_output+0x78/0x110 ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 ip_local_out+0x64/0x70 __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460 ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0 tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0 tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0 tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100 vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0 ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x640 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3b/0xd0 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fc03ad14a37 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffdf8697fe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008024 RCX: 00007fc03ad14a37 RDX: 0000000000008024 RSI: 0000556f46bd8270 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000556f46bb1800 R08: 0000000000007fe3 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000556f46bc66b0 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000556f46bb2f50 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8228ad34bd1a25047586270f7b1fb4ddcd046282.1706433934.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Enabling CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST raises many warnings in wilc driver, even on some places already protected by a read critical section. An example of such case is in wilc_get_available_idx: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.8.0-rc1+ #32 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/netdev.c:944 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [...] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 26 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #32 Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5 Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x58 dump_stack_lvl from wilc_netdev_ifc_init+0x788/0x8ec wilc_netdev_ifc_init from wilc_cfg80211_init+0x690/0x910 wilc_cfg80211_init from wilc_sdio_probe+0x168/0x490 wilc_sdio_probe from sdio_bus_probe+0x230/0x3f4 sdio_bus_probe from really_probe+0x270/0xdf4 really_probe from __driver_probe_device+0x1dc/0x580 __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x60/0x140 driver_probe_device from __device_attach_driver+0x268/0x364 __device_attach_driver from bus_for_each_drv+0x15c/0x1cc bus_for_each_drv from __device_attach+0x1ec/0x3e8 __device_attach from bus_probe_device+0x190/0x1c0 bus_probe_device from device_add+0x10dc/0x18e4 device_add from sdio_add_func+0x1c0/0x2c0 sdio_add_func from mmc_attach_sdio+0xa08/0xe1c mmc_attach_sdio from mmc_rescan+0xa00/0xfe0 mmc_rescan from process_one_work+0x8d4/0x169c process_one_work from worker_thread+0x8cc/0x1340 worker_thread from kthread+0x448/0x510 kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 This warning is due to the section being protected by a srcu critical read section, but the list traversal being done with classic RCU API. Fix the warning by using corresponding SRCU read lock/unlock APIs. While doing so, since we always manipulate the same list (managed through a pointer embedded in struct_wilc), add a macro to reduce the corresponding boilerplate in each call site. Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org> Link: https://msgid.link/20240215-wilc_fix_rcu_usage-v1-2-f610e46c6f82@bootlin.com
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it. Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region. The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken as default. The implementation is as follows: REG_AX = SRC_REG if(offset) REG_AX += offset; REG_AX >>= 32; if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32)) DST_REG = 0; else DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset); Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down to a 4GB boundary before comparison. The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory above the userspace. Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program dereferencing an untrusted pointer: SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect") int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk) { *(volatile long *)sk; return 0; } BPF Program before | BPF Program after ------------------ | ----------------- 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1 ----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32 2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2 3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) \ 5: (05) goto pc+1 \ 6: (b7) r1 = 0 \-------------------------------------- 7: (b7) r0 = 0 8: (95) exit As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions are emitted. Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been added around it. x86-64 JIT ========== JIT's Instrumentation (upstream) --------------------- 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 5: xchg %ax,%ax 7: push %rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11 19: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: jb 0x000000000000002a 1e: mov %rdi,%r11 21: add $0x0,%r11 28: jae 0x000000000000002e 2a: xor %edi,%edi 2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032 2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- 32: xor %eax,%eax 34: leave 35: ret The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT. ARM64 JIT ========= No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 4: nop 4: nop 8: paciasp 8: paciasp c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp 28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0 -----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32 3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12 40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050 44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0] 48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054 4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0 50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \--------------------------------------- 54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0 58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp 5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 70: add x0, x7, #0x0 74: autiasp 78: ret 7c: nop 80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088 84: br x10 There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will become 7 in the worst case (off != 0). RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled) ========== No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: nop 0: nop 4: nop 4: nop 8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33 c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16 18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0) --------------------------------------------------------------- 1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0 --------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32 20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096 24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1 28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12 2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0) 30: ret \ 34: j 8 \ 38: li a0, 0 \------------------------------ 3c: li a5, 0 40: ld s0, 8(sp) 44: addi sp, sp, 16 48: sext.w a0, a5 4c: ret There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V. Fixes: 8008342 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables") Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Inline calls to bpf_get_smp_processor_id() helper in the JIT by emitting a read from struct thread_info. The SP_EL0 system register holds the pointer to the task_struct and thread_info is the first member of this struct. We can read the cpu number from the thread_info. Here is how the ARM64 JITed assembly changes after this commit: ARM64 JIT =========== BEFORE AFTER -------- ------- int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); mov x10, #0xfffffffffffff4d0 mrs x10, sp_el0 movk x10, #0x802b, lsl #16 ldr w7, [x10, #24] movk x10, #0x8000, lsl #32 blr x10 add x7, x0, #0x0 Performance improvement using benchmark[1] ./benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh glob-arr-inc arr-inc hash-inc +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------+ | Name | Before | After | % change | |---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------| | glob-arr-inc | 23.380 ± 1.675M/s | 25.893 ± 0.026M/s | + 10.74% | | arr-inc | 23.928 ± 0.034M/s | 25.213 ± 0.063M/s | + 5.37% | | hash-inc | 12.352 ± 0.005M/s | 12.609 ± 0.013M/s | + 2.08% | +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------+ [1] anakryiko/linux@8dec900975ef Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502151854.9810-5-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Puranjay Mohan says: ==================== bpf: Inline helpers in arm64 and riscv JITs Changes in v5 -> v6: arm64 v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240430234739.79185-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ riscv v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240430175834.33152-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ - Combine riscv and arm64 changes in single series - Some coding style fixes Changes in v4 -> v5: v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240429131647.50165-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ - Implement the inlining of the bpf_get_smp_processor_id() in the JIT. NOTE: This needs to be based on: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240430175834.33152-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ to be built. Manual run of bpf-ci with this series rebased on above: kernel-patches/bpf#6929 Changes in v3 -> v4: v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240426121349.97651-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ - Fix coding style issue related to C89 standards. Changes in v2 -> v3: v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240424173550.16359-1-puranjay@kernel.org/ - Fixed the xlated dump of percpu mov to "r0 = &(void __percpu *)(r0)" - Made ARM64 and x86-64 use the same code for inlining. The only difference that remains is the per-cpu address of the cpu_number. Changes in v1 -> v2: v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240405091707.66675-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/ - Add a patch to inline bpf_get_smp_processor_id() - Fix an issue in MRS instruction encoding as pointed out by Will - Remove CONFIG_SMP check because arm64 kernel always compiles with CONFIG_SMP This series adds the support of internal only per-CPU instructions and inlines the bpf_get_smp_processor_id() helper call for ARM64 and RISC-V BPF JITs. Here is an example of calls to bpf_get_smp_processor_id() and percpu_array_map_lookup_elem() before and after this series on ARM64. BPF ===== BEFORE AFTER -------- ------- int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); (85) call bpf_get_smp_processor_id#229032 (85) call bpf_get_smp_processor_id#8 p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &zero); p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &zero); (18) r1 = map[id:78] (18) r1 = map[id:153] (18) r2 = map[id:82][0]+65536 (18) r2 = map[id:157][0]+65536 (85) call percpu_array_map_lookup_elem#313512 (07) r1 += 496 (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+5 (67) r0 <<= 3 (0f) r0 += r1 (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) (bf) r0 = &(void __percpu *)(r0) (05) goto pc+1 (b7) r0 = 0 ARM64 JIT =========== BEFORE AFTER -------- ------- int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); mov x10, #0xfffffffffffff4d0 mrs x10, sp_el0 movk x10, #0x802b, lsl #16 ldr w7, [x10, #24] movk x10, #0x8000, lsl #32 blr x10 add x7, x0, #0x0 p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &zero); p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, &zero); mov x0, #0xffff0003ffffffff mov x0, #0xffff0003ffffffff movk x0, #0xce5c, lsl #16 movk x0, #0xe0f3, lsl #16 movk x0, #0xca00 movk x0, #0x7c00 mov x1, #0xffff8000ffffffff mov x1, #0xffff8000ffffffff movk x1, #0x8bdb, lsl #16 movk x1, #0xb0c7, lsl #16 movk x1, #0x6000 movk x1, #0xe000 mov x10, #0xffffffffffff3ed0 add x0, x0, #0x1f0 movk x10, #0x802d, lsl #16 ldr w7, [x1] movk x10, #0x8000, lsl #32 cmp x7, #0x1 blr x10 b.cs 0x0000000000000090 add x7, x0, #0x0 lsl x7, x7, #3 add x7, x7, x0 ldr x7, [x7] mrs x10, tpidr_el1 add x7, x7, x10 b 0x0000000000000094 mov x7, #0x0 Performance improvement found using benchmark[1] ./benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh glob-arr-inc arr-inc hash-inc +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------+ | Name | Before | After | % change | |---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------| | glob-arr-inc | 23.380 ± 1.675M/s | 25.893 ± 0.026M/s | + 10.74% | | arr-inc | 23.928 ± 0.034M/s | 25.213 ± 0.063M/s | + 5.37% | | hash-inc | 12.352 ± 0.005M/s | 12.609 ± 0.013M/s | + 2.08% | +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+--------------+ [1] anakryiko/linux@8dec900975ef RISCV64 JIT output for `call bpf_get_smp_processor_id` ======================================================= Before After -------- ------- auipc t1,0x848c ld a5,32(tp) jalr 604(t1) mv a5,a0 Benchmark using [1] on Qemu. ./benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh glob-arr-inc arr-inc hash-inc +---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+ | Name | Before | After | % change | |---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------| | glob-arr-inc | 1.077 ± 0.006M/s | 1.336 ± 0.010M/s | + 24.04% | | arr-inc | 1.078 ± 0.002M/s | 1.332 ± 0.015M/s | + 23.56% | | hash-inc | 0.494 ± 0.004M/s | 0.653 ± 0.001M/s | + 32.18% | +---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502151854.9810-1-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in __unix_walk_scc() [1]. In the list_for_each_entry_reverse() loop, when the vertex's index equals it's scc_index, the loop uses the variable vertex as a temporary variable that points to a vertex in scc. And when the loop is finished, the variable vertex points to the list head, in this case scc, which is a local variable on the stack (more precisely, it's not even scc and might underflow the call stack of __unix_walk_scc(): container_of(&scc, struct unix_vertex, scc_entry)). However, the variable vertex is used under the label prev_vertex. So if the edge_stack is not empty and the function jumps to the prev_vertex label, the function will access invalid data on the stack. This causes the uninit-value access issue. Fix this by introducing a new temporary variable for the loop. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __unix_walk_scc net/unix/garbage.c:478 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in unix_walk_scc net/unix/garbage.c:526 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __unix_gc+0x2589/0x3c20 net/unix/garbage.c:584 __unix_walk_scc net/unix/garbage.c:478 [inline] unix_walk_scc net/unix/garbage.c:526 [inline] __unix_gc+0x2589/0x3c20 net/unix/garbage.c:584 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x1bf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 worker_thread+0xeb6/0x15b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x3c4/0x530 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Uninit was stored to memory at: unix_walk_scc net/unix/garbage.c:526 [inline] __unix_gc+0x2adf/0x3c20 net/unix/garbage.c:584 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x1bf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3312 worker_thread+0xeb6/0x15b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x3c4/0x530 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Local variable entries created at: ref_tracker_free+0x48/0xf30 lib/ref_tracker.c:222 netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4058 [inline] netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4075 [inline] dev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4101 [inline] update_gid_event_work_handler+0xaa/0x1b0 drivers/infiniband/core/roce_gid_mgmt.c:813 CPU: 1 PID: 12763 Comm: kworker/u8:31 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc Fixes: 3484f06 ("af_unix: Detect Strongly Connected Components.") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240702160428.10153-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
KMSAN reported uninit-value access in raw_lookup() [1]. Diag for raw sockets uses the pad field in struct inet_diag_req_v2 for the underlying protocol. This field corresponds to the sdiag_raw_protocol field in struct inet_diag_req_raw. inet_diag_get_exact_compat() converts inet_diag_req to inet_diag_req_v2, but leaves the pad field uninitialized. So the issue occurs when raw_lookup() accesses the sdiag_raw_protocol field. Fix this by initializing the pad field in inet_diag_get_exact_compat(). Also, do the same fix in inet_diag_dump_compat() to avoid the similar issue in the future. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71 raw_lookup net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:49 [inline] raw_sock_get+0x657/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline] inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was stored to memory at: raw_sock_get+0x650/0x800 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:71 raw_diag_dump_one+0xa1/0x660 net/ipv4/raw_diag.c:99 inet_diag_cmd_exact+0x7d9/0x980 inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1404 [inline] inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x469/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282 netlink_rcv_skb+0x537/0x670 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 sock_diag_rcv+0x35/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:297 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xe74/0x1240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10c6/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7f0/0xb70 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2639 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2668 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2677 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2675 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x27e/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2675 x64_sys_call+0x135e/0x3ce0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Local variable req.i created at: inet_diag_get_exact_compat net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1396 [inline] inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x2a6/0x530 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1426 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x740 net/core/sock_diag.c:282 CPU: 1 PID: 8888 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-00217-g35bb670d65fc #32 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Fixes: 432490f ("net: ip, diag -- Add diag interface for raw sockets") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703091649.111773-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
On ARM64, the pointer to task_struct is always available in the sp_el0 register and therefore the calls to bpf_get_current_task() and bpf_get_current_task_btf() can be inlined into a single MRS instruction. Here is the difference before and after this change: Before: ; struct task_struct *task = bpf_get_current_task_btf(); 54: mov x10, #0xffffffffffff7978 // #-34440 58: movk x10, #0x802b, lsl #16 5c: movk x10, #0x8000, lsl #32 60: blr x10 --------------> 0xffff8000802b7978 <+0>: mrs x0, sp_el0 64: add x7, x0, #0x0 <-------------- 0xffff8000802b797c <+4>: ret After: ; struct task_struct *task = bpf_get_current_task_btf(); 54: mrs x7, sp_el0 This shows around 1% performance improvement in artificial microbenchmark. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619131334.4297-1-puranjay@kernel.org
(don't remember the HEAD I am currently running syzkaller on :-/ )
syz-repro:
C-repro:
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