am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines #4

mranostay · 2012-11-24T11:36:14Z

Sometimes you need use the other SPI bus in the device tree due to
pin muxing this allows easy references for switching.

Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay mranostay@gmail.com

Sometimes you need use the other SPI bus in the device tree due to pin muxing this allows easy references for switching. Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay <mranostay@gmail.com>

koenkooi · 2012-11-26T09:47:39Z

This is a generated tree, so the patch has to get merged into https://github.com/beagleboard/kernel/

In 32 bit the stack address provided by kernel_stack_pointer() may point to an invalid range causing NULL pointer access or page faults while in NMI (see trace below). This happens if called in softirq context and if the stack is empty. The address at &regs->sp is then out of range. Fixing this by checking if regs and &regs->sp are in the same stack context. Otherwise return the previous stack pointer stored in struct thread_info. If that address is invalid too, return address of regs. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000a IP: [<c1004237>] print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: Pid: 4434, comm: perl Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-oprofile-i386-standard-g4411a05 #4 Hewlett-Packard HP xw9400 Workstation/0A1Ch EIP: 0060:[<c1004237>] EFLAGS: 00010093 CPU: 0 EIP is at print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d EAX: ffffe000 EBX: 0000000a ECX: f4435f94 EDX: 0000000a ESI: f4435f94 EDI: f4435f94 EBP: f5409ec0 ESP: f5409ea0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 8005003b CR2: 0000000a CR3: 34ac9000 CR4: 000007d0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process perl (pid: 4434, ti=f5408000 task=f5637850 task.ti=f4434000) Stack: 000003e8 ffffe000 00001ffc f4e39b00 00000000 0000000a f4435f94 c155198c f5409ef0 c1003723 c155198c f5409f04 00000000 f5409edc 00000000 00000000 f5409ee8 f4435f94 f5409fc4 00000001 f5409f1c c12dce1c 00000000 c155198c Call Trace: [<c1003723>] dump_trace+0x7b/0xa1 [<c12dce1c>] x86_backtrace+0x40/0x88 [<c12db712>] ? oprofile_add_sample+0x56/0x84 [<c12db731>] oprofile_add_sample+0x75/0x84 [<c12ddb5b>] op_amd_check_ctrs+0x46/0x260 [<c12dd40d>] profile_exceptions_notify+0x23/0x4c [<c1395034>] nmi_handle+0x31/0x4a [<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45 [<c13950ed>] do_nmi+0xa0/0x2ff [<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45 [<c13949e5>] nmi_stack_correct+0x28/0x2d [<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45 [<c1003603>] ? do_softirq+0x4b/0x7f <IRQ> [<c102a06f>] irq_exit+0x35/0x5b [<c1018f56>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x7a [<c1394746>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30 Code: 89 fe eb 08 31 c9 8b 45 0c ff 55 ec 83 c3 04 83 7d 10 00 74 0c 3b 5d 10 73 26 3b 5d e4 73 0c eb 1f 3b 5d f0 76 1a 3b 5d e8 73 15 <8b> 13 89 d0 89 55 e0 e8 ad 42 03 00 85 c0 8b 55 e0 75 a6 eb cc EIP: [<c1004237>] print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d SS:ESP 0068:f5409ea0 CR2: 000000000000000a ---[ end trace 62afee3481b00012 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt V2: * add comments to kernel_stack_pointer() * always return a valid stack address by falling back to the address of regs Reported-by: Yang Wei <wei.yang@windriver.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120912135059.GZ8285@erda.amd.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Zhang <jun.zhang@intel.com>

A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling off, never to be seen again. In the case where this occurred, an exiting thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex, bringing the box to its knees. PID: 18105 TASK: ffff8807fd412180 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kdmflush" #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489 #1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs] #2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14 #3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs] #4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2 #5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41 #6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a #7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88 #8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850 #9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper] RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0 RSP: ffff8808157e7f58 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8107af60 RDI: ffff8803ee491d18 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

The offset must be multiplied by 4 to be sure to access the correct 32bit word in the stack scratch space. For instance, a store at scratch memory cell #1 was generating the following: st r4, [sp, #1] While the correct code for this is: st r4, [sp, #4] To reproduce the bug (assuming your system has a NIC with the mac address 52:54:00:12:34:56): echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable tcpdump -ni eth0 "ether[1] + ether[2] - ether[3] * ether[4] - ether[5] \ == -0x3AA" # this will capture packets as expected echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable tcpdump -ni eth0 "ether[1] + ether[2] - ether[3] * ether[4] - ether[5] \ == -0x3AA" # this will not. This bug was present since the original inclusion of bpf_jit for ARM (ddecdfc: ARM: 7259/3: net: JIT compiler for packet filters). Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schichan <nschichan@freebox.fr> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Commit 648bb56 ("cgroup: lock cgroup_mutex in cgroup_init_subsys()") made cgroup_init_subsys() grab cgroup_mutex before invoking ->css_alloc() for the root css. Because memcg registers hotcpu notifier from ->css_alloc() for the root css, this introduced circular locking dependency between cgroup_mutex and cpu hotplug. Fix it by moving hotcpu notifier registration to a subsys initcall. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.7.0-rc4-work+ torvalds#42 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- bash/645 is trying to acquire lock: (cgroup_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8110c5b7>] cgroup_lock+0x17/0x20 but task is already holding lock: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8109300f>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2f/0x60 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x97/0x1e0 mutex_lock_nested+0x61/0x3b0 get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x60 rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x1b/0x70 cpuset_write_resmask+0x298/0x2c0 cgroup_file_write+0x1ef/0x300 vfs_write+0xa8/0x160 sys_write+0x52/0xa0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b -> #0 (cgroup_mutex){+.+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0x14ce/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x97/0x1e0 mutex_lock_nested+0x61/0x3b0 cgroup_lock+0x17/0x20 cpuset_handle_hotplug+0x1b/0x560 cpuset_update_active_cpus+0xe/0x10 cpuset_cpu_inactive+0x47/0x50 notifier_call_chain+0x66/0x150 __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 __cpu_notify+0x20/0x40 _cpu_down+0x7e/0x2f0 cpu_down+0x36/0x50 store_online+0x5d/0xe0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 sysfs_write_file+0xe0/0x150 vfs_write+0xa8/0x160 sys_write+0x52/0xa0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); lock(cgroup_mutex); lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); lock(cgroup_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/645: #0: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8123bab8>] sysfs_write_file+0x48/0x150 #1: (s_active#42){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8123bb38>] sysfs_write_file+0xc8/0x150 #2: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81079277>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x1 +7/0x20 #3: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81093157>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x17/0x20 #4: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8109300f>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2f/0x60 stack backtrace: Pid: 645, comm: bash Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-work+ torvalds#42 Call Trace: print_circular_bug+0x28e/0x29f __lock_acquire+0x14ce/0x1d20 lock_acquire+0x97/0x1e0 mutex_lock_nested+0x61/0x3b0 cgroup_lock+0x17/0x20 cpuset_handle_hotplug+0x1b/0x560 cpuset_update_active_cpus+0xe/0x10 cpuset_cpu_inactive+0x47/0x50 notifier_call_chain+0x66/0x150 __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 __cpu_notify+0x20/0x40 _cpu_down+0x7e/0x2f0 cpu_down+0x36/0x50 store_online+0x5d/0xe0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 sysfs_write_file+0xe0/0x150 vfs_write+0xa8/0x160 sys_write+0x52/0xa0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The new_node_page() is processed as the following procedure. 1. A new node page is allocated. 2. Set PageUptodate with proper footer information. 3. Check if there is a free space for allocation 4.a. If there is no space, f2fs returns with -ENOSPC. 4.b. Otherwise, go next. In the case of step #4.a, f2fs remains a wrong node page in the page cache with the uptodate flag. Also, even though a new node page is allocated successfully, an error can be occurred afterwards due to allocation failure of the other data structures. In such a case, remove_inode_page() would be triggered, so that we have to clear uptodate flag in truncate_node() too. So, we should remove the uptodate flag, if allocation is failed. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>

Pursuant to this review https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/12/500 by Stefan Richter, update the TODO file. - Clarify purpose of TODO file - Remove firewire item #4. As discussed in this conversation https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/13/564 knowing the AR buffer size is not a hard requirement. The required rx buffer size can be determined experimentally. - Remove firewire item #5. This was a private note for further experimentation. - Change firewire item #1. Change suggested header from uapi header to kernel-only header. Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Acked-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a47970f upstream. This fixes an oops where a LAYOUTGET is in still in the rpciod queue, but the requesting processes has been killed. Without this, killing the process does the final pnfs_put_layout_hdr() and sets NFS_I(inode)->layout to NULL while the LAYOUTGET rpc task still references it. Example oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080 IP: [<ffffffffa01bd586>] pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid+0x37/0xef [nfsv4] PGD 7365b067 PUD 7365d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: nfs_layout_nfsv41_files nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs lockd sunrpc ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle ip6table_filter ip6_tables ppdev e1000 i2c_piix4 i2c_core shpchp parport_pc parport crc32c_intel aesni_intel xts aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase floppy autofs4 CPU 0 Pid: 27, comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.8.0-dros_cthon2013+ #4 VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01bd586>] [<ffffffffa01bd586>] pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid+0x37/0xef [nfsv4] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b0c1c88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88006ed36678 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000ea877e3bc RDX: ffff88007a729da8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88007a72b958 RBP: ffff88007b0c1ca8 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88007a72b958 R13: ffff88007a729da8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa011077e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000000735f8000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 27, threadinfo ffff88007b0c0000, task ffff88007c2fa0c0) Stack: ffff88006fc05388 ffff88007a72b908 ffff88007b240900 ffff88006fc05388 ffff88007b0c1cd8 ffffffffa01a2170 ffff88007b240900 ffff88007b240900 ffff88007b240970 ffffffffa011077e ffff88007b0c1ce8 ffffffffa0110791 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa01a2170>] nfs4_layoutget_prepare+0x7b/0x92 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa011077e>] ? __rpc_atrun+0x15/0x15 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0110791>] rpc_prepare_task+0x13/0x15 [sunrpc] Reported-by: Tigran Mkrtchyan <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 66efdc7 upstream. snd_seq_timer_open() didn't catch the whole error path but let through if the timer id is a slave. This may lead to Oops by accessing the uninitialized pointer. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002ae IP: [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130 PGD 785cd067 PUD 76964067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#4] SMP CPU 0 Pid: 4288, comm: trinity-child7 Tainted: G D W 3.9.0-rc1+ torvalds#100 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff819b3477>] [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffff88006ece7d38 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000286 RBX: ffff88007851b400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000ffff RSI: ffff88006ece7d58 RDI: ffff88006ece7d38 RBP: ffff88006ece7d98 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 000000000000fffe R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800792c5400 R14: 0000000000e8f000 R15: 0000000000000007 FS: 00007f7aaa650700(0000) GS:ffff88007f800000(0000) GS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000002ae CR3: 000000006efec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process trinity-child7 (pid: 4288, threadinfo ffff88006ece6000, task ffff880076a8a290) Stack: 0000000000000286 ffffffff828f2be0 ffff88006ece7d58 ffffffff810f354d 65636e6575716573 2065756575712072 ffff8800792c0030 0000000000000000 ffff88006ece7d98 ffff8800792c5400 ffff88007851b400 ffff8800792c5520 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff819b17e9>] snd_seq_queue_timer_open+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff819ae01a>] snd_seq_ioctl_set_queue_timer+0xda/0x120 [<ffffffff819acb9b>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x9b/0xd0 [<ffffffff819acbe0>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x10/0x20 [<ffffffff811b9542>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x522/0x570 [<ffffffff8130a4b3>] ? file_has_perm+0x83/0xa0 [<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff811b95ed>] sys_ioctl+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff813663fe>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81faed69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-and-tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 9cb6cb7 ] The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 #1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 #2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 #3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 #4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 #5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 #6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 #7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 #8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 #9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 torvalds#10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 torvalds#11 <signal handler called> torvalds#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () torvalds#13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

-Top level ARC makefile removes -I for platform headers -asm/irq.h no longer includes plat/irq.h -platform makefile adds -I for it's specfic platform headers -platform code to directly include it's plat/irq.h -Linker script needed plat/memmap.h for CCM info, already in .config Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

This fixes an oops where a LAYOUTGET is in still in the rpciod queue, but the requesting processes has been killed. Without this, killing the process does the final pnfs_put_layout_hdr() and sets NFS_I(inode)->layout to NULL while the LAYOUTGET rpc task still references it. Example oops: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080 IP: [<ffffffffa01bd586>] pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid+0x37/0xef [nfsv4] PGD 7365b067 PUD 7365d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: nfs_layout_nfsv41_files nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs lockd sunrpc ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle ip6table_filter ip6_tables ppdev e1000 i2c_piix4 i2c_core shpchp parport_pc parport crc32c_intel aesni_intel xts aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase floppy autofs4 CPU 0 Pid: 27, comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.8.0-dros_cthon2013+ #4 VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01bd586>] [<ffffffffa01bd586>] pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid+0x37/0xef [nfsv4] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b0c1c88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88006ed36678 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000ea877e3bc RDX: ffff88007a729da8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88007a72b958 RBP: ffff88007b0c1ca8 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88007a72b958 R13: ffff88007a729da8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffa011077e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000000735f8000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 27, threadinfo ffff88007b0c0000, task ffff88007c2fa0c0) Stack: ffff88006fc05388 ffff88007a72b908 ffff88007b240900 ffff88006fc05388 ffff88007b0c1cd8 ffffffffa01a2170 ffff88007b240900 ffff88007b240900 ffff88007b240970 ffffffffa011077e ffff88007b0c1ce8 ffffffffa0110791 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa01a2170>] nfs4_layoutget_prepare+0x7b/0x92 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa011077e>] ? __rpc_atrun+0x15/0x15 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa0110791>] rpc_prepare_task+0x13/0x15 [sunrpc] Reported-by: Tigran Mkrtchyan <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

…ernel/git/vgupta/arc Pull new ARC architecture from Vineet Gupta: "Initial ARC Linux port with some fixes on top for 3.9-rc1: I would like to introduce the Linux port to ARC Processors (from Synopsys) for 3.9-rc1. The patch-set has been discussed on the public lists since Nov and has received a fair bit of review, specially from Arnd, tglx, Al and other subsystem maintainers for DeviceTree, kgdb... The arch bits are in arch/arc, some asm-generic changes (acked by Arnd), a minor change to PARISC (acked by Helge). The series is a touch bigger for a new port for 2 main reasons: 1. It enables a basic kernel in first sub-series and adds ptrace/kgdb/.. later 2. Some of the fallout of review (DeviceTree support, multi-platform- image support) were added on top of orig series, primarily to record the revision history. This updated pull request additionally contains - fixes due to our GNU tools catching up with the new syscall/ptrace ABI - some (minor) cross-arch Kconfig updates." * tag 'arc-v3.9-rc1-late' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (82 commits) ARC: split elf.h into uapi and export it for userspace ARC: Fixup the current ABI version ARC: gdbserver using regset interface possibly broken ARC: Kconfig cleanup tracking cross-arch Kconfig pruning in merge window ARC: make a copy of flat DT ARC: [plat-arcfpga] DT arc-uart bindings change: "baud" => "current-speed" ARC: Ensure CONFIG_VIRT_TO_BUS is not enabled ARC: Fix pt_orig_r8 access ARC: [3.9] Fallout of hlist iterator update ARC: 64bit RTSC timestamp hardware issue ARC: Don't fiddle with non-existent caches ARC: Add self to MAINTAINERS ARC: Provide a default serial.h for uart drivers needing BASE_BAUD ARC: [plat-arcfpga] defconfig for fully loaded ARC Linux ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #8: platform registers SMP callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #7: SMP common code to use callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #6: cpu-to-dma-addr optional ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #5: NR_IRQS defined by ARC core ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #4: Isolate platform headers ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image #3: switch to board callback ...

…optimizations Recent GCC versions (e.g. GCC-4.7.2) perform optimizations based on assumptions about the implementation of memset and similar functions. The current ARM optimized memset code does not return the value of its first argument, as is usually expected from standard implementations. For instance in the following function: void debug_mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, struct mutex_waiter *waiter) { memset(waiter, MUTEX_DEBUG_INIT, sizeof(*waiter)); waiter->magic = waiter; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&waiter->list); } compiled as: 800554d0 <debug_mutex_lock_common>: 800554d0: e92d4008 push {r3, lr} 800554d4: e1a00001 mov r0, r1 800554d8: e3a02010 mov r2, torvalds#16 ; 0x10 800554dc: e3a01011 mov r1, torvalds#17 ; 0x11 800554e0: eb04426e bl 80165ea0 <memset> 800554e4: e1a03000 mov r3, r0 800554e8: e583000c str r0, [r3, torvalds#12] 800554ec: e5830000 str r0, [r3] 800554f0: e5830004 str r0, [r3, #4] 800554f4: e8bd8008 pop {r3, pc} GCC assumes memset returns the value of pointer 'waiter' in register r0; causing register/memory corruptions. This patch fixes the return value of the assembly version of memset. It adds a 'mov' instruction and merges an additional load+store into existing load/store instructions. For ease of review, here is a breakdown of the patch into 4 simple steps: Step 1 ====== Perform the following substitutions: ip -> r8, then r0 -> ip, and insert 'mov ip, r0' as the first statement of the function. At this point, we have a memset() implementation returning the proper result, but corrupting r8 on some paths (the ones that were using ip). Step 2 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 1: save r8: - str lr, [sp, #-4]! + stmfd sp!, {r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: - ldmeqfd sp!, {pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. + ldmeqfd sp!, {r8, pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. (...) tst r2, torvalds#16 stmneia ip!, {r1, r3, r8, lr} - ldr lr, [sp], #4 + ldmfd sp!, {r8, lr} Step 3 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 0: save r8: - stmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + stmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: bgt 3b - ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r7, pc} + ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r8, pc} (...) tst r2, torvalds#16 stmneia ip!, {r4-r7} - ldmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + ldmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} Step 4 ====== Rewrite register list "r4-r7, r8" as "r4-r8". Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 #1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 #2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 #3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 #4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 #5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 #6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 #7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 #8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 #9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 torvalds#10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 torvalds#11 <signal handler called> torvalds#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () torvalds#13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

snd_seq_timer_open() didn't catch the whole error path but let through if the timer id is a slave. This may lead to Oops by accessing the uninitialized pointer. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002ae IP: [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130 PGD 785cd067 PUD 76964067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#4] SMP CPU 0 Pid: 4288, comm: trinity-child7 Tainted: G D W 3.9.0-rc1+ torvalds#100 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff819b3477>] [<ffffffff819b3477>] snd_seq_timer_open+0xe7/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffff88006ece7d38 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000286 RBX: ffff88007851b400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000ffff RSI: ffff88006ece7d58 RDI: ffff88006ece7d38 RBP: ffff88006ece7d98 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 000000000000fffe R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8800792c5400 R14: 0000000000e8f000 R15: 0000000000000007 FS: 00007f7aaa650700(0000) GS:ffff88007f800000(0000) GS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000002ae CR3: 000000006efec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process trinity-child7 (pid: 4288, threadinfo ffff88006ece6000, task ffff880076a8a290) Stack: 0000000000000286 ffffffff828f2be0 ffff88006ece7d58 ffffffff810f354d 65636e6575716573 2065756575712072 ffff8800792c0030 0000000000000000 ffff88006ece7d98 ffff8800792c5400 ffff88007851b400 ffff8800792c5520 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff819b17e9>] snd_seq_queue_timer_open+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff819ae01a>] snd_seq_ioctl_set_queue_timer+0xda/0x120 [<ffffffff819acb9b>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x9b/0xd0 [<ffffffff819acbe0>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x10/0x20 [<ffffffff811b9542>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x522/0x570 [<ffffffff8130a4b3>] ? file_has_perm+0x83/0xa0 [<ffffffff810f354d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff811b95ed>] sys_ioctl+0x5d/0xa0 [<ffffffff813663fe>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81faed69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-and-tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

ca22e56 (driver-core: implement 'sysdev' functionality for regular devices and buses) has introduced bus_register macro with a static key to distinguish different subsys mutex classes. This however doesn't work for different subsys which use a common registering function. One example is subsys_system_register (and mce_device and cpu_device). In the end this leads to the following lockdep splat: [ 207.271924] ====================================================== [ 207.271932] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 207.271942] 3.9.0-rc1-0.7-default+ torvalds#34 Not tainted [ 207.271948] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 207.271957] bash/10493 is trying to acquire lock: [ 207.271963] (subsys mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8134af27>] bus_remove_device+0x37/0x1c0 [ 207.271987] [ 207.271987] but task is already holding lock: [ 207.271995] (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81046ccf>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2f/0x60 [ 207.272012] [ 207.272012] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 207.272012] [ 207.272023] [ 207.272023] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 207.272033] [ 207.272033] -> #4 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}: [ 207.272044] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.272056] [<ffffffff814ad807>] mutex_lock_nested+0x37/0x360 [ 207.272069] [<ffffffff81046ba9>] get_online_cpus+0x29/0x40 [ 207.272082] [<ffffffff81185210>] drain_all_stock+0x30/0x150 [ 207.272094] [<ffffffff811853da>] mem_cgroup_reclaim+0xaa/0xe0 [ 207.272104] [<ffffffff8118775e>] __mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x51e/0xcf0 [ 207.272114] [<ffffffff81188486>] mem_cgroup_charge_common+0x36/0x60 [ 207.272125] [<ffffffff811884da>] mem_cgroup_newpage_charge+0x2a/0x30 [ 207.272135] [<ffffffff81150531>] do_wp_page+0x231/0x830 [ 207.272147] [<ffffffff8115151e>] handle_pte_fault+0x19e/0x8d0 [ 207.272157] [<ffffffff81151da8>] handle_mm_fault+0x158/0x1e0 [ 207.272166] [<ffffffff814b6153>] do_page_fault+0x2a3/0x4e0 [ 207.272178] [<ffffffff814b2578>] page_fault+0x28/0x30 [ 207.272189] [ 207.272189] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}: [ 207.272199] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.272208] [<ffffffff8114c5ad>] might_fault+0x6d/0x90 [ 207.272218] [<ffffffff811a11e3>] filldir64+0xb3/0x120 [ 207.272229] [<ffffffffa013fc19>] call_filldir+0x89/0x130 [ext3] [ 207.272248] [<ffffffffa0140377>] ext3_readdir+0x6b7/0x7e0 [ext3] [ 207.272263] [<ffffffff811a1519>] vfs_readdir+0xa9/0xc0 [ 207.272273] [<ffffffff811a15cb>] sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x110 [ 207.272284] [<ffffffff814bb599>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 207.272296] [ 207.272296] -> #2 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#3){+.+.+.}: [ 207.272309] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.272319] [<ffffffff814ad807>] mutex_lock_nested+0x37/0x360 [ 207.272329] [<ffffffff8119c254>] link_path_walk+0x6f4/0x9a0 [ 207.272339] [<ffffffff8119e7fa>] path_openat+0xba/0x470 [ 207.272349] [<ffffffff8119ecf8>] do_filp_open+0x48/0xa0 [ 207.272358] [<ffffffff8118d81c>] file_open_name+0xdc/0x110 [ 207.272369] [<ffffffff8118d885>] filp_open+0x35/0x40 [ 207.272378] [<ffffffff8135c76e>] _request_firmware+0x52e/0xb20 [ 207.272389] [<ffffffff8135cdd6>] request_firmware+0x16/0x20 [ 207.272399] [<ffffffffa03bdb91>] request_microcode_fw+0x61/0xd0 [microcode] [ 207.272416] [<ffffffffa03bd554>] microcode_init_cpu+0x104/0x150 [microcode] [ 207.272431] [<ffffffffa03bd61c>] mc_device_add+0x7c/0xb0 [microcode] [ 207.272444] [<ffffffff8134a419>] subsys_interface_register+0xc9/0x100 [ 207.272457] [<ffffffffa04fc0f4>] 0xffffffffa04fc0f4 [ 207.272472] [<ffffffff81000202>] do_one_initcall+0x42/0x180 [ 207.272485] [<ffffffff810bbeff>] load_module+0x19df/0x1b70 [ 207.272499] [<ffffffff810bc376>] sys_init_module+0xe6/0x130 [ 207.272511] [<ffffffff814bb599>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 207.272523] [ 207.272523] -> #1 (umhelper_sem){++++.+}: [ 207.272537] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.272548] [<ffffffff814ae9c4>] down_read+0x34/0x50 [ 207.272559] [<ffffffff81062bff>] usermodehelper_read_trylock+0x4f/0x100 [ 207.272575] [<ffffffff8135c7dd>] _request_firmware+0x59d/0xb20 [ 207.272587] [<ffffffff8135cdd6>] request_firmware+0x16/0x20 [ 207.272599] [<ffffffffa03bdb91>] request_microcode_fw+0x61/0xd0 [microcode] [ 207.272613] [<ffffffffa03bd554>] microcode_init_cpu+0x104/0x150 [microcode] [ 207.272627] [<ffffffffa03bd61c>] mc_device_add+0x7c/0xb0 [microcode] [ 207.272641] [<ffffffff8134a419>] subsys_interface_register+0xc9/0x100 [ 207.272654] [<ffffffffa04fc0f4>] 0xffffffffa04fc0f4 [ 207.272666] [<ffffffff81000202>] do_one_initcall+0x42/0x180 [ 207.272678] [<ffffffff810bbeff>] load_module+0x19df/0x1b70 [ 207.272690] [<ffffffff810bc376>] sys_init_module+0xe6/0x130 [ 207.272702] [<ffffffff814bb599>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 207.272715] [ 207.272715] -> #0 (subsys mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 207.272729] [<ffffffff810ae002>] __lock_acquire+0x13b2/0x15f0 [ 207.272740] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.272751] [<ffffffff814ad807>] mutex_lock_nested+0x37/0x360 [ 207.272763] [<ffffffff8134af27>] bus_remove_device+0x37/0x1c0 [ 207.272775] [<ffffffff81349114>] device_del+0x134/0x1f0 [ 207.272786] [<ffffffff813491f2>] device_unregister+0x22/0x60 [ 207.272798] [<ffffffff814a24ea>] mce_cpu_callback+0x15e/0x1ad [ 207.272812] [<ffffffff814b6402>] notifier_call_chain+0x72/0x130 [ 207.272824] [<ffffffff81073d6e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 207.272839] [<ffffffff81498f76>] _cpu_down+0x1d6/0x350 [ 207.272851] [<ffffffff81499130>] cpu_down+0x40/0x60 [ 207.272862] [<ffffffff8149cc55>] store_online+0x75/0xe0 [ 207.272874] [<ffffffff813474a0>] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x30 [ 207.272886] [<ffffffff812090d9>] sysfs_write_file+0xd9/0x150 [ 207.272900] [<ffffffff8118e10b>] vfs_write+0xcb/0x130 [ 207.272911] [<ffffffff8118e924>] sys_write+0x64/0xa0 [ 207.272923] [<ffffffff814bb599>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 207.272936] [ 207.272936] other info that might help us debug this: [ 207.272936] [ 207.272952] Chain exists of: [ 207.272952] subsys mutex --> &mm->mmap_sem --> cpu_hotplug.lock [ 207.272952] [ 207.272973] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 207.272973] [ 207.272984] CPU0 CPU1 [ 207.272992] ---- ---- [ 207.273000] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 207.273009] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [ 207.273020] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 207.273031] lock(subsys mutex); [ 207.273040] [ 207.273040] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 207.273040] [ 207.273055] 5 locks held by bash/10493: [ 207.273062] #0: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81209049>] sysfs_write_file+0x49/0x150 [ 207.273080] #1: (s_active#150){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff812090c2>] sysfs_write_file+0xc2/0x150 [ 207.273099] #2: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81027557>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 207.273121] #3: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8149911c>] cpu_down+0x2c/0x60 [ 207.273140] #4: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81046ccf>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2f/0x60 [ 207.273158] [ 207.273158] stack backtrace: [ 207.273170] Pid: 10493, comm: bash Not tainted 3.9.0-rc1-0.7-default+ torvalds#34 [ 207.273180] Call Trace: [ 207.273192] [<ffffffff810ab373>] print_circular_bug+0x223/0x310 [ 207.273204] [<ffffffff810ae002>] __lock_acquire+0x13b2/0x15f0 [ 207.273216] [<ffffffff812086b0>] ? sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x60/0xc0 [ 207.273227] [<ffffffff810ae329>] lock_acquire+0xe9/0x120 [ 207.273239] [<ffffffff8134af27>] ? bus_remove_device+0x37/0x1c0 [ 207.273251] [<ffffffff814ad807>] mutex_lock_nested+0x37/0x360 [ 207.273263] [<ffffffff8134af27>] ? bus_remove_device+0x37/0x1c0 [ 207.273274] [<ffffffff812086b0>] ? sysfs_hash_and_remove+0x60/0xc0 [ 207.273286] [<ffffffff8134af27>] bus_remove_device+0x37/0x1c0 [ 207.273298] [<ffffffff81349114>] device_del+0x134/0x1f0 [ 207.273309] [<ffffffff813491f2>] device_unregister+0x22/0x60 [ 207.273321] [<ffffffff814a24ea>] mce_cpu_callback+0x15e/0x1ad [ 207.273332] [<ffffffff814b6402>] notifier_call_chain+0x72/0x130 [ 207.273344] [<ffffffff81073d6e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 207.273356] [<ffffffff81498f76>] _cpu_down+0x1d6/0x350 [ 207.273368] [<ffffffff81027557>] ? cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 207.273380] [<ffffffff81499130>] cpu_down+0x40/0x60 [ 207.273391] [<ffffffff8149cc55>] store_online+0x75/0xe0 [ 207.273402] [<ffffffff813474a0>] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x30 [ 207.273413] [<ffffffff812090d9>] sysfs_write_file+0xd9/0x150 [ 207.273425] [<ffffffff8118e10b>] vfs_write+0xcb/0x130 [ 207.273436] [<ffffffff8118e924>] sys_write+0x64/0xa0 [ 207.273447] [<ffffffff814bb599>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Which reports a false possitive deadlock because it sees: 1) load_module -> subsys_interface_register -> mc_deveice_add (*) -> subsys->p->mutex -> link_path_walk -> lookup_slow -> i_mutex 2) sys_write -> _cpu_down -> cpu_hotplug_begin -> cpu_hotplug.lock -> mce_cpu_callback -> mce_device_remove(**) -> device_unregister -> bus_remove_device -> subsys mutex 3) vfs_readdir -> i_mutex -> filldir64 -> might_fault -> might_lock_read(mmap_sem) -> page_fault -> mmap_sem -> drain_all_stock -> cpu_hotplug.lock but 1) takes cpu_subsys subsys (*) but 2) takes mce_device subsys (**) so the deadlock is not possible AFAICS. The fix is quite simple. We can pull the key inside bus_type structure because they are defined per device so the pointer will be unique as well. bus_register doesn't need to be a macro anymore so change it to the inline. We could get rid of __bus_register as there is no other caller but maybe somebody will want to use a different key so keep it around for now. Reported-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The first backtrace appears on tx path with DMA mapping operations debug enabled. [ 345.637919] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 345.637971] WARNING: at lib/dma-debug.c:937 check_unmap+0x4df/0x910() [ 345.637977] Hardware name: System Name [ 345.637987] sis900 0000:00:01.1: DMA-API: device driver failed to check map error[device address=0x000000000d4aed02] [si ze=60 bytes] [mapped as single] [ 345.637993] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc dmfe sundance 3c59x sis900 [ 345.638022] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.9.0-rc6+ #4 [ 345.638028] Call Trace: [ 345.638042] [<c122097f>] ? check_unmap+0x4df/0x910 [ 345.638059] [<c102b19c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7c/0xa0 [ 345.638070] [<c122097f>] ? check_unmap+0x4df/0x910 [ 345.638081] [<c102b23e>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2e/0x30 [ 345.638092] [<c122097f>] check_unmap+0x4df/0x910 [ 345.638107] [<c100bfeb>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2b/0x50 [ 345.638120] [<c107238e>] ? mark_lock+0x31e/0x5d0 [ 345.638132] [<c1072b2c>] ? __lock_acquire+0x4ec/0x7d0 [ 345.638143] [<c1220f6d>] debug_dma_unmap_page+0x6d/0x80 [ 345.638166] [<cf834dec>] sis900_interrupt+0x49c/0x860 [sis900] [ 345.638195] [<c1094b73>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x43/0x1c0 [ 345.638206] [<c1094d1e>] ? handle_irq_event+0x2e/0x60 [ 345.638217] [<c1094d27>] handle_irq_event+0x37/0x60 [ 345.638235] [<c10973f0>] ? irq_set_chip_data+0x40/0x40 [ 345.638246] [<c1097442>] handle_level_irq+0x52/0xa0 [ 345.638251] <IRQ> [<c1003629>] ? do_IRQ+0x39/0xa0 [ 345.638293] [<c1484631>] ? common_interrupt+0x31/0x36 [ 345.638347] [<d08c2c52>] ? br_flood_forward+0x12/0x20 [bridge] [ 345.638364] [<d08c2d40>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x60/0x60 [bridge] [ 345.638381] [<d08c3b2b>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x25b/0x280 [bridge] [ 345.638399] [<d08c3ce3>] ? br_handle_frame+0x193/0x290 [bridge] [ 345.638416] [<d08c3b50>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x280/0x280 [bridge] [ 345.638431] [<c13b3c87>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1d7/0x710 [ 345.638442] [<c13b3b19>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x69/0x710 [ 345.638454] [<c13b41e1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70 [ 345.638464] [<c13b42b5>] ? process_backlog+0x85/0x130 [ 345.638476] [<c13b4bbb>] ? net_rx_action+0xfb/0x1d0 [ 345.638497] [<c1032768>] ? __do_softirq+0xa8/0x1f0 [ 345.638527] [<c147daad>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1d/0x20 [ 345.638538] [<c10038c0>] ? handle_irq+0x20/0xd0 [ 345.638550] [<c1032f27>] ? irq_exit+0x97/0xa0 [ 345.638560] [<c1003632>] ? do_IRQ+0x42/0xa0 [ 345.638580] [<c104d003>] ? hrtimer_start+0x23/0x30 [ 345.638580] [<c1484631>] ? common_interrupt+0x31/0x36 [ 345.638580] [<c1008703>] ? default_idle+0x33/0xc0 [ 345.638580] [<c10086ac>] ? cpu_idle+0x4c/0x70 [ 345.638580] [<c14787e0>] ? rest_init+0xa0/0xb0 [ 345.638580] [<c1478740>] ? reciprocal_value+0x50/0x50 [ 345.638580] [<c16b5bcf>] ? start_kernel+0x28f/0x320 [ 345.638580] [<c16b54e0>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60 [ 345.638580] [<c16b5269>] ? i386_start_kernel+0x39/0xa0 [ 345.638580] ---[ end trace a244264b69b8a7ae ]--- [ 345.638580] Mapped at: [ 345.638580] [<c1221c65>] debug_dma_map_page+0x65/0x110 [ 345.638580] [<cf8355a9>] sis900_start_xmit+0x129/0x210 [sis900] [ 345.638580] [<c13b2527>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1b7/0x530 [ 345.638580] [<c13cc32e>] sch_direct_xmit+0x8e/0x280 [ 345.638580] [<c13b4e39>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1a9/0x5b0 Signed-off-by: Denis Kirjanov <kda@linux-powerpc.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 66.460000] ================================= [ 66.460000] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] [ 66.460000] 3.9.0-rc5-00161-ga48dd49 #4 Not tainted [ 66.460000] --------------------------------- [ 66.460000] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [ 66.460000] swapper/1 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: [ 66.460000] (timer_lock){+.?...}, at: [<d0006cde>] rs_poll+0x12/0xdc [ 66.460000] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [ 66.460000] [<d00421f0>] lock_acquire+0xec/0x13c [ 66.460000] [<d01ea036>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3a/0x84 [ 66.460000] [<d0006c8c>] rs_open+0x18/0x58 [ 66.460000] [<d0139ea2>] tty_open+0x262/0x3cc [ 66.460000] [<d00942e0>] chrdev_open+0x8c/0xe0 [ 66.460000] [<d00907b2>] do_dentry_open$isra$16+0x10e/0x190 [ 66.460000] [<d0091141>] finish_open+0x39/0x48 [ 66.460000] [<d009a0b4>] do_last$isra$34+0x6c4/0x824 [ 66.460000] [<d009a27a>] path_openat+0x66/0x310 [ 66.460000] [<d009a53a>] do_filp_open+0x16/0x44 [ 66.460000] [<d0091445>] do_sys_open+0xd5/0x13c [ 66.460000] [<d00914be>] sys_open+0x12/0x18 [ 66.460000] [<d0413ffc>] kernel_init_freeable+0xe4/0x12c [ 66.460000] [<d01e2a9c>] kernel_init+0xc/0x9c [ 66.460000] [<d00044fc>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xc [ 66.460000] irq event stamp: 132542 [ 66.460000] hardirqs last enabled at (132542): [<d01ea2ec>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x44 [ 66.460000] hardirqs last disabled at (132541): [<d01ea11e>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xe/0x8c [ 66.460000] softirqs last enabled at (132234): [<d0017d32>] __do_softirq+0x216/0x2a4 [ 66.460000] softirqs last disabled at (132539): [<d0018024>] irq_exit+0x38/0x40 [ 66.460000] [ 66.460000] other info that might help us debug this: [ 66.460000] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 66.460000] [ 66.460000] CPU0 [ 66.460000] ---- [ 66.460000] lock(timer_lock); [ 66.460000] <Interrupt> [ 66.460000] lock(timer_lock); [ 66.460000] [ 66.460000] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 66.460000] [ 66.460000] 1 lock held by swapper/1: [ 66.460000] #0: (((&serial_timer))){+.-...}, at: [<d001c65c>] call_timer_fn+0x0/0x1f0 [ 66.460000] Stack: d7c2fac0 00000018 00000004 00000001 d7c2faa0 00000004 00000006 d7c2fa90 9003e87c d7c2fae0 d7c30000 d025a87c 00000001 0000000f 00000000 d7c2fac0 9004005d d7c2fb10 d7c30000 d7c30338 00000001 00000001 00000000 d7c30338 [ 66.460000] Call Trace: [ 66.460000] [<d01e4f93>] print_usage_bug$part$26+0x1c3/0x1c8 [ 66.460000] [<d003e87c>] mark_lock+0x2b4/0x440 [ 66.460000] [<d004005d>] __lock_acquire+0x54d/0x16c4 [ 66.460000] [<d00421f0>] lock_acquire+0xec/0x13c [ 66.460000] [<d01ea036>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3a/0x84 [ 66.460000] [<d0006cde>] rs_poll+0x12/0xdc [ 66.460000] [<d001c71a>] call_timer_fn+0xbe/0x1f0 [ 66.460000] [<d001cd90>] run_timer_softirq+0x198/0x1f4 [ 66.460000] [<d0017c30>] __do_softirq+0x114/0x2a4 [ 66.460000] [<d0018024>] irq_exit+0x38/0x40 [ 66.460000] [<d00046c0>] do_IRQ+0x44/0x48 [ 66.460000] [<d0005c58>] do_interrupt+0x4c/0x54 [ 66.460000] [<d0003c80>] common_exception_return+0x0/0x5c [ 66.460000] [<d006682c>] free_pcppages_bulk+0x254/0x308 [ 66.460000] Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>

This can easily be triggered if a new CPU is added (via ACPI hotplug mechanism) and from user-space you do: echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online (or wait for UDEV to do it) on a newly appeared physical CPU. The deadlock is that the "store_online" in drivers/base/cpu.c takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock, then calls "cpu_up". "cpu_up" eventually ends up calling "save_mc_for_early" which also takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock. And here is that lockdep thinks of it: smpboot: Stack at about ffff880075c39f44 smpboot: CPU3: has booted. microcode: CPU3 sig=0x206a7, pf=0x2, revision=0x25 ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.9.0upstream-10129-g167af0e #1 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- sh/2487 is trying to acquire lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 but task is already holding lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by sh/2487: #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811ca48d>] vfs_write+0x17d/0x190 #1: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812464ef>] sysfs_write_file+0x3f/0x160 #2: (s_active#20){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81246578>] sysfs_write_file+0xc8/0x160 #3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 #4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810961c2>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x12/0x20 #5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810962a7>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x27/0x60 Suggested-and-Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v3.9 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368029583-23337-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Cleanup regex_lock and ftrace_lock locking points around ftrace_ops hash update code. The new rule is that regex_lock protects ops->*_hash read-update-write code for each ftrace_ops. Usually, hash update is done by following sequence. 1. allocate a new local hash and copy the original hash. 2. update the local hash. 3. move(actually, copy) back the local hash to ftrace_ops. 4. update ftrace entries if needed. 5. release the local hash. This makes regex_lock protect #1-#4, and ftrace_lock to protect #3, #4 and adding and removing ftrace_ops from the ftrace_ops_list. The ftrace_lock protects #3 as well because the move functions update the entries too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130509054421.30398.83411.stgit@mhiramat-M0-7522 Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

@cpu

… into node number df2d5ae ("workqueue: map an unbound workqueues to multiple per-node pool_workqueues") made unbound workqueues to map to multiple per-node pool_workqueues and accordingly updated workqueue_contested() so that, for unbound workqueues, it maps the specified @cpu to the NUMA node number to obtain the matching pool_workqueue to query the congested state. Before this change, workqueue_congested() ignored @cpu for unbound workqueues as there was only one pool_workqueue and some users (fscache) called it with WORK_CPU_UNBOUND. After the commit, this causes the following oops as WORK_CPU_UNBOUND gets translated to garbage by cpu_to_node(). BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8803598d98b8 IP: [<ffffffff81043b7e>] unbound_pwq_by_node+0xa1/0xfa PGD 2421067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 2689 Comm: cat Tainted: GF 3.9.0-fsdevel+ #4 task: ffff88003d801040 ti: ffff880025806000 task.ti: ffff880025806000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81043b7e>] [<ffffffff81043b7e>] unbound_pwq_by_node+0xa1/0xfa RSP: 0018:ffff880025807ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8800388a2400 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: ffff880025807fd8 RSI: ffffffff81a31420 RDI: ffff88003d8016e0 RBP: ffff880025807ae8 R08: ffff88003d801730 R09: ffffffffa00b4898 R10: ffffffff81044217 R11: ffff88003d801040 R12: 0000000064206e97 R13: ffff880036059d98 R14: ffff880038cc8080 R15: ffff880038cc82d0 FS: 00007f21afd9c740(0000) GS:ffff88003d100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: ffff8803598d98b8 CR3: 000000003df49000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff8800388a2400 0000000000000002 ffff880025807b18 ffffffff810442ce ffffffff81044217 ffff880000000002 ffff8800371b4080 ffff88003d112ec0 ffff880025807b38 ffffffffa00810b0 ffff880036059d88 ffff880036059be8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810442ce>] workqueue_congested+0xb7/0x12c [<ffffffffa00810b0>] fscache_enqueue_object+0xb2/0xe8 [fscache] [<ffffffffa007facd>] __fscache_acquire_cookie+0x3b9/0x56c [fscache] [<ffffffffa00ad8fe>] nfs_fscache_set_inode_cookie+0xee/0x132 [nfs] [<ffffffffa009e112>] do_open+0x9/0xd [nfs] [<ffffffff810e804a>] do_dentry_open+0x175/0x24b [<ffffffff810e8298>] finish_open+0x41/0x51 Fix it by using smp_processor_id() if @cpu is WORK_CPU_UNBOUND. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-and-Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit fb745e9 ("net/802/mrp: fix possible race condition when calling mrp_pdu_queue()") introduced a lockdep splat. [ 19.735147] ================================= [ 19.735235] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] [ 19.735324] 3.9.2-build-0063 #4 Not tainted [ 19.735412] --------------------------------- [ 19.735500] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 19.735592] rmmod/1840 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: [ 19.735682] (&(&app->lock)->rlock#2){+.?...}, at: [<f862bb5b>] mrp_uninit_applicant+0x69/0xba [mrp] app->lock is normally taken under softirq context, so disable BH to avoid the splat. Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: David Ward <david.ward@ll.mit.edu> Cc: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com> Tested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It is required to enable respective clock-domain before enabling any clock/module inside that clock-domain. During common-clock migration, .clkdm_name field got missed for "clkdiv32k_ick" clock, which leaves "clk_24mhz_clkdm" unused; so it will be disabled even if childs of this clock-domain is enabled, which keeps child modules in idle mode. This fixes the kernel crash observed on AM335xEVM-SK platform, where clkdiv32_ick clock is being used as a gpio debounce clock and since clkdiv32k_ick is in idle mode it leads to below crash - Crash Log: ========== [ 2.598347] Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1028) at 0xfa1ac150 [ 2.606434] Internal error: : 1028 [#1] SMP ARM [ 2.611207] Modules linked in: [ 2.614449] CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.8.4-01382-g1f449cd-dirty #4) [ 2.620973] PC is at _set_gpio_debounce+0x60/0x104 [ 2.626025] LR is at clk_enable+0x30/0x3c Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9 Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Hiremath <hvaibhav@ti.com> Cc: Rajendra Nayak <rnayak@ti.com> Acked-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: #3 [ffff88003fc03938] __stack_chk_fail at ffffffff81037f77 #4 [ffff88003fc03948] icmp_send at ffffffff814d5fec #5 [ffff88003fc03ae8] ipv4_link_failure at ffffffff814a1795 #6 [ffff88003fc03af8] ipgre_tunnel_xmit at ffffffff814e7965 #7 [ffff88003fc03b78] dev_hard_start_xmit at ffffffff8146e032 #8 [ffff88003fc03bc8] sch_direct_xmit at ffffffff81487d66 #9 [ffff88003fc03c08] __qdisc_run at ffffffff81487efd torvalds#10 [ffff88003fc03c48] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffff8146e5a7 torvalds#11 [ffff88003fc03c88] ip_finish_output at ffffffff814ab596 Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

commit 7c388f9 upstream. Remove stale debug trace. Fixes: 1eb42f9 ("qla2xxx: Make trace flags more readable") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.10 Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1e4ac5d upstream. If chip unable to fully initialize, use full shutdown sequence to clear out any stale FW state. Fixes: e315cd2 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Code changes for qla data structure refactoring") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.10 Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6ce220d ] If stripe in batch list is set with STRIPE_HANDLE flag, then the stripe could be set with STRIPE_ACTIVE by the handle_stripe function. And if error happens to the batch_head at the same time, break_stripe_batch_list is called, then below warning could happen (the same report in [1]), it means a member of batch list was set with STRIPE_ACTIVE. [7028915.431770] stripe state: 2001 [7028915.431815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [7028915.431828] WARNING: CPU: 18 PID: 29089 at drivers/md/raid5.c:4614 break_stripe_batch_list+0x203/0x240 [raid456] [...] [7028915.431879] CPU: 18 PID: 29089 Comm: kworker/u82:5 Tainted: G O 4.14.86-1-storage #4.14.86-1.2~deb9 [7028915.431881] Hardware name: Supermicro SSG-2028R-ACR24L/X10DRH-iT, BIOS 3.1 06/18/2018 [7028915.431888] Workqueue: raid5wq raid5_do_work [raid456] [7028915.431890] task: ffff9ab0ef36d7c0 task.stack: ffffb72926f84000 [7028915.431896] RIP: 0010:break_stripe_batch_list+0x203/0x240 [raid456] [7028915.431898] RSP: 0018:ffffb72926f87ba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [7028915.431900] RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: ffff9aaa84a98000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [7028915.431901] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9ab2bfa15458 RDI: ffff9ab2bfa15458 [7028915.431902] RBP: ffff9aaa8fb4e900 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000002eb4 [7028915.431903] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ab1736f1b00 [7028915.431904] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9aaa8fb4e900 R15: 0000000000000001 [7028915.431906] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ab2bfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [7028915.431907] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [7028915.431908] CR2: 00007ff953b9f5d8 CR3: 0000000bf4009002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [7028915.431909] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [7028915.431910] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [7028915.431910] Call Trace: [7028915.431923] handle_stripe+0x8e7/0x2020 [raid456] [7028915.431930] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x89/0xc0 [7028915.431935] handle_active_stripes.isra.58+0x35f/0x560 [raid456] [7028915.431939] raid5_do_work+0xc6/0x1f0 [raid456] Also commit 59fc630 ("RAID5: batch adjacent full stripe write") said "If a stripe is added to batch list, then only the first stripe of the list should be put to handle_list and run handle_stripe." So don't set STRIPE_HANDLE to stripe which is already in batch list, otherwise the stripe could be put to handle_list and run handle_stripe, then the above warning could be triggered. [1]. https://www.spinics.net/lists/raid/msg62552.html Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 143f6e7 upstream. 7471fb7 ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in RAID6.") avoids rereading P when it can be computed from other members. However, this misses the chance to re-write the right data to P. This patch sets R5_ReadError if the re-read fails. Also, when re-read is skipped, we also missed the chance to reset rdev->read_errors to 0. It can fail the disk when there are many read errors on P member disk (other disks don't have read error) V2: upper layer read request don't read parity/Q data. So there is no need to consider such situation. This is Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 7471fb7 ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in RAID6.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+ Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3ca9419 upstream. Reported by syzkaller: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6544 at /home/kernel/data/kvm/arch/x86/kvm//vmx/vmx.c:4689 handle_desc+0x37/0x40 [kvm_intel] CPU: 0 PID: 6544 Comm: a.out Tainted: G OE 5.3.0-rc4+ #4 RIP: 0010:handle_desc+0x37/0x40 [kvm_intel] Call Trace: vmx_handle_exit+0xbe/0x6b0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x4dc/0x18d0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x407/0x660 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3ad/0x690 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x690 ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x720 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe When CR4.UMIP is set, guest should have UMIP cpuid flag. Current kvm set_sregs function doesn't have such check when userspace inputs sregs values. SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled on writes to CR4.UMIP in vmx_set_cr4 though guest doesn't have UMIP cpuid flag. The testcast triggers handle_desc warning when executing ltr instruction since guest architectural CR4 doesn't set UMIP. This patch fixes it by adding valid CR4 and CPUID combination checking in __set_sregs. syzkaller source: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=138efb99600000 Reported-by: syzbot+0f1819555fbdce992df9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 0216234 upstream. We release wrong pointer on error path in cpu_cache_level__read function, leading to segfault: (gdb) r record ls Starting program: /root/perf/tools/perf/perf record ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] double free or corruption (out) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff7463798 in raise () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7463798 in raise () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff7443bac in abort () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff74af8bc in __libc_message () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007ffff74b92b8 in malloc_printerr () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #4 0x00007ffff74bb874 in _int_free () from /lib64/power9/libc.so.6 #5 0x0000000010271260 in __zfree (ptr=0x7fffffffa0b0) at ../../lib/zalloc.. #6 0x0000000010139340 in cpu_cache_level__read (cache=0x7fffffffa090, cac.. #7 0x0000000010143c90 in build_caches (cntp=0x7fffffffa118, size=<optimiz.. ... Releasing the proper pointer. Fixes: 720e98b ("perf tools: Add perf data cache feature") Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org: # v4.6+ Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190912105235.10689-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 443f2d5 upstream. Observe a segmentation fault when 'perf stat' is asked to repeat forever with the interval option. Without fix: # perf stat -r 0 -I 5000 -e cycles -a sleep 10 # time counts unit events 5.000211692 3,13,89,82,34,157 cycles 10.000380119 1,53,98,52,22,294 cycles 10.040467280 17,16,79,265 cycles Segmentation fault This problem was only observed when we use forever option aka -r 0 and works with limited repeats. Calling print_counter with ts being set to NULL, is not a correct option when interval is set. Hence avoid print_counter(NULL,..) if interval is set. With fix: # perf stat -r 0 -I 5000 -e cycles -a sleep 10 # time counts unit events 5.019866622 3,15,14,43,08,697 cycles 10.039865756 3,15,16,31,95,261 cycles 10.059950628 1,26,05,47,158 cycles 5.009902655 3,14,52,62,33,932 cycles 10.019880228 3,14,52,22,89,154 cycles 10.030543876 66,90,18,333 cycles 5.009848281 3,14,51,98,25,437 cycles 10.029854402 3,15,14,93,04,918 cycles 5.009834177 3,14,51,95,92,316 cycles Committer notes: Did the 'git bisect' to find the cset introducing the problem to add the Fixes tag below, and at that time the problem reproduced as: (gdb) run stat -r0 -I500 sleep 1 <SNIP> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. print_interval (prefix=prefix@entry=0x7fffffffc8d0 "", ts=ts@entry=0x0) at builtin-stat.c:866 866 sprintf(prefix, "%6lu.%09lu%s", ts->tv_sec, ts->tv_nsec, csv_sep); (gdb) bt #0 print_interval (prefix=prefix@entry=0x7fffffffc8d0 "", ts=ts@entry=0x0) at builtin-stat.c:866 #1 0x000000000041860a in print_counters (ts=ts@entry=0x0, argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffd640) at builtin-stat.c:938 #2 0x0000000000419a7f in cmd_stat (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffd640, prefix=<optimized out>) at builtin-stat.c:1411 #3 0x000000000045c65a in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x6291b8 <commands+216>, argc=argc@entry=5, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffd640) at perf.c:370 #4 0x000000000045c893 in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd640) at perf.c:429 #5 0x000000000045c8f1 in run_argv (argcp=argcp@entry=0x7fffffffd4ac, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffd4a0) at perf.c:473 #6 0x000000000045cac9 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:588 (gdb) Mostly the same as just before this patch: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005874a7 in print_interval (config=0xa1f2a0 <stat_config>, evlist=0xbc9b90, prefix=0x7fffffffd1c0 "`", ts=0x0) at util/stat-display.c:964 964 sprintf(prefix, "%6lu.%09lu%s", ts->tv_sec, ts->tv_nsec, config->csv_sep); (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005874a7 in print_interval (config=0xa1f2a0 <stat_config>, evlist=0xbc9b90, prefix=0x7fffffffd1c0 "`", ts=0x0) at util/stat-display.c:964 #1 0x0000000000588047 in perf_evlist__print_counters (evlist=0xbc9b90, config=0xa1f2a0 <stat_config>, _target=0xa1f0c0 <target>, ts=0x0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at util/stat-display.c:1172 #2 0x000000000045390f in print_counters (ts=0x0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at builtin-stat.c:656 #3 0x0000000000456bb5 in cmd_stat (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at builtin-stat.c:1960 #4 0x00000000004dd2e0 in run_builtin (p=0xa30e00 <commands+288>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:310 #5 0x00000000004dd54d in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:362 #6 0x00000000004dd694 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffd4cc, argv=0x7fffffffd4c0) at perf.c:406 #7 0x00000000004dda11 in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:531 (gdb) Fixes: d4f63a4 ("perf stat: Introduce print_counters function") Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190904094738.9558-3-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1fac4a5 upstream. [BUG] One user reported a reproducible KASAN report about use-after-free: BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: start -dvrange=1256811659264..1256811659265 BTRFS info (device sdi1): relocating block group 1256811659264 flags data|raid0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88856f671710 by task kworker/u24:10/261579 CPU: 2 PID: 261579 Comm: kworker/u24:10 Tainted: P OE 5.2.11-arch1-1-kasan #4 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./X99 Extreme4, BIOS P3.80 04/06/2018 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper [btrfs] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7b/0xba print_address_description+0x6c/0x22e ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x3b ? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] kasan_report+0x12/0x17 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x20 btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x7bf/0x18a0 [btrfs] ? lock_repin_lock+0x400/0x400 ? __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x140/0x1ad ? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0x9b0/0x9b0 [btrfs] finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] normal_work_helper+0x1bd/0xca0 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x819/0x1720 ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x8c9/0x1720 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2f0/0x2f0 ? worker_thread+0x1d9/0x1030 worker_thread+0x98/0x1030 kthread+0x2bb/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x1720/0x1720 ? kthread_park+0x120/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Allocated by task 369692: __kasan_kmalloc.part.0+0x44/0xc0 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xba/0xc0 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x260 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x92/0x360 [btrfs] btrfs_read_fs_root+0x10/0xb0 [btrfs] create_reloc_root+0x47d/0xa10 [btrfs] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x1e2/0x340 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs] btrfs_start_transaction+0x1e/0x20 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1c2/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x13/0x20 [btrfs] prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x29f/0x570 [btrfs] relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x193/0xc30 [btrfs] relocate_data_extent+0x1f8/0x490 [btrfs] relocate_block_group+0x600/0x1060 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Freed by task 369692: __kasan_slab_free+0x14f/0x210 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 kfree+0xd8/0x270 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x154c/0x1eb0 [btrfs] clean_dirty_subvols+0x227/0x340 [btrfs] relocate_block_group+0x972/0x1060 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88856f671100 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 1552 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff88856f671100, ffff88856f672100) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0015bd9c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88864400e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x2ffff0000010200(slab|head) raw: 02ffff0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88864400e600 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88856f671600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88856f671680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88856f671700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88856f671780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88856f671800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== BTRFS info (device sdi1): 1 enospc errors during balance BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: ended with status: -28 [CAUSE] The problem happens when finish_ordered_io() get called with balance still running, while the reloc root of that subvolume is already dead. (Tree is swap already done, but tree not yet deleted for possible qgroup usage.) That means root->reloc_root still exists, but that reloc_root can be under btrfs_drop_snapshot(), thus we shouldn't access it. The following race could cause the use-after-free problem: CPU1 | CPU2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | relocate_block_group() | |- unset_reloc_control(rc) | |- btrfs_commit_transaction() btrfs_finish_ordered_io() | |- clean_dirty_subvols() |- btrfs_join_transaction() | | |- record_root_in_trans() | | |- btrfs_init_reloc_root() | | |- if (root->reloc_root) | | | | |- root->reloc_root = NULL | | |- btrfs_drop_snapshot(reloc_root); |- reloc_root->last_trans| = trans->transid | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Use after free [FIX] Fix it by the following modifications: - Test if the root has dead reloc tree before accessing root->reloc_root If the root has BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE, then we don't need to create or update root->reloc_tree - Clear the BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE flag until we have fully dropped reloc tree To co-operate with above modification, so as long as BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE is still set, we won't try to re-create reloc tree at record_root_in_trans(). Reported-by: Cebtenzzre <cebtenzzre@gmail.com> Fixes: d2311e6 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9f61419 upstream. Looks like the dma_sync calls don't do what we want on armv7 either. Fixes: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 50001000 pgd = (ptrval) [50001000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 805 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc6-00271-g9f159ae07f07 #4 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX53 (Device Tree Support) PC is at v7_dma_clean_range+0x20/0x38 LR is at __dma_page_cpu_to_dev+0x28/0x90 pc : [<c011c76c>] lr : [<c01181c4>] psr: 20000013 sp : d80b5a88 ip : de96c000 fp : d840ce6c r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000001 r8 : d843e010 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00008000 r5 : ddb6c000 r4 : 00000000 r3 : 0000003f r2 : 00000040 r1 : 50008000 r0 : 50001000 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c5387d Table: 70004019 DAC: 00000051 Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Fixes: 3de433c ("drm/msm: Use the correct dma_sync calls in msm_gem") Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 254503a upstream. The drm/omap driver was fixed to correct an issue where using a divider of 32 breaks the DSS despite the TRM stating 32 is a valid number. Through experimentation, it appears that 31 works, and it is consistent with the value used by the drm/omap driver. This patch fixes the divider for fbdev driver instead of the drm. Fixes: f76ee89 ("omapfb: copy omapdss & displays for omapfb") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.5+ Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com> [b.zolnierkie: mark patch as applicable to stable 4.5+ (was 4.9+)] Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200630182636.439015-1-aford173@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ab0db04 ] When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ torvalds#20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ torvalds#20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 9f4aa52 upstream. During initialization of the DASD DIAG driver a request is issued that has a bio structure that resides on the stack. With virtually mapped kernel stacks this bio address might be in virtual storage which is unsuitable for usage with the diag250 call. In this case the device can not be set online using the DIAG discipline and fails with -EOPNOTSUP. In the system journal the following error message is presented: dasd: X.X.XXXX Setting the DASD online with discipline DIAG failed with rc=-95 Fix by allocating the bio structure instead of having it on the stack. Fixes: ce3dc44 ("s390: add support for virtually mapped kernel stacks") Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.20 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 18c850f upstream. There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

… set [ Upstream commit 1101c87 ] We received an error report that perf-record caused 'Segmentation fault' on a newly system (e.g. on the new installed ubuntu). (gdb) backtrace #0 __read_once_size (size=4, res=<synthetic pointer>, p=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/compiler.h:139 #1 atomic_read (v=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/asm/../../arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:28 #2 refcount_read (r=0x14) at /root/0-jinyao/acme/tools/include/linux/refcount.h:65 #3 perf_mmap__read_init (map=map@entry=0x0) at mmap.c:177 #4 0x0000561ce5c0de39 in perf_evlist__poll_thread (arg=0x561ce68584d0) at util/sideband_evlist.c:62 #5 0x00007fad78491609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 #6 0x00007fad7823c103 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 The root cause is, evlist__add_bpf_sb_event() just returns 0 if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not defined (inline function path). So it will not create a valid evsel for side-band event. But perf-record still creates BPF side band thread to process the side-band event, then the error happpens. We can reproduce this issue by removing the libelf-dev. e.g. 1. apt-get remove libelf-dev 2. perf record -a -- sleep 1 root@test:~# ./perf record -a -- sleep 1 perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 6 stack frames. ./perf(+0x28eee8) [0x5562d6ef6ee8] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x46210) [0x7fbfdc65f210] ./perf(+0x342e74) [0x5562d6faae74] ./perf(+0x257e39) [0x5562d6ebfe39] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x9609) [0x7fbfdc990609] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(clone+0x43) [0x7fbfdc73b103] Segmentation fault (core dumped) To fix this issue, 1. We either install the missing libraries to let HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT be defined. e.g. apt-get install libelf-dev and install other related libraries. 2. Use this patch to skip the side-band event setup if HAVE_LIBBPF_SUPPORT is not set. Committer notes: The side band thread is not used just with BPF, it is also used with --switch-output-event, so narrow the ifdef to the BPF specific part. Fixes: 23cbb41 ("perf record: Move side band evlist setup to separate routine") Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@intel.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200805022937.29184-1-yao.jin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 2d9a2c5 upstream. Before v4.15 commit 75492a5 ("s390/scsi: Convert timers to use timer_setup()"), we intentionally only passed zfcp_adapter as context argument to zfcp_fsf_request_timeout_handler(). Since we only trigger adapter recovery, it was unnecessary to sync against races between timeout and (late) completion. Likewise, we only passed zfcp_erp_action as context argument to zfcp_erp_timeout_handler(). Since we only wakeup an ERP action, it was unnecessary to sync against races between timeout and (late) completion. Meanwhile the timeout handlers get timer_list as context argument and do a timer-specific container-of to zfcp_fsf_req which can have been freed. Fix it by making sure that any request timeout handlers, that might just have started before del_timer(), are completed by using del_timer_sync() instead. This ensures the request free happens afterwards. Space time diagram of potential use-after-free: Basic idea is to have 2 or more pending requests whose timeouts run out at almost the same time. req 1 timeout ERP thread req 2 timeout ---------------- ---------------- --------------------------------------- zfcp_fsf_request_timeout_handler fsf_req = from_timer(fsf_req, t, timer) adapter = fsf_req->adapter zfcp_qdio_siosl(adapter) zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen(adapter,...) zfcp_erp_strategy ... zfcp_fsf_req_dismiss_all list_for_each_entry_safe zfcp_fsf_req_complete 1 del_timer 1 zfcp_fsf_req_free 1 zfcp_fsf_req_complete 2 zfcp_fsf_request_timeout_handler del_timer 2 fsf_req = from_timer(fsf_req, t, timer) zfcp_fsf_req_free 2 adapter = fsf_req->adapter ^^^^^^^ already freed Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200813152856.50088-1-maier@linux.ibm.com Fixes: 75492a5 ("s390/scsi: Convert timers to use timer_setup()") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.15+ Suggested-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b0f3b87 ] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208565 PID: 257 TASK: ecdd0000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "init" #0 [<c0b420ec>] (__schedule) from [<c0b423c8>] #1 [<c0b423c8>] (schedule) from [<c0b459d4>] #2 [<c0b459d4>] (rwsem_down_read_failed) from [<c0b44fa0>] #3 [<c0b44fa0>] (down_read) from [<c044233c>] #4 [<c044233c>] (f2fs_truncate_blocks) from [<c0442890>] #5 [<c0442890>] (f2fs_truncate) from [<c044d408>] #6 [<c044d408>] (f2fs_evict_inode) from [<c030be18>] #7 [<c030be18>] (evict) from [<c030a558>] #8 [<c030a558>] (iput) from [<c047c600>] #9 [<c047c600>] (f2fs_sync_node_pages) from [<c0465414>] torvalds#10 [<c0465414>] (f2fs_write_checkpoint) from [<c04575f4>] torvalds#11 [<c04575f4>] (f2fs_sync_fs) from [<c0441918>] torvalds#12 [<c0441918>] (f2fs_do_sync_file) from [<c0441098>] torvalds#13 [<c0441098>] (f2fs_sync_file) from [<c0323fa0>] torvalds#14 [<c0323fa0>] (vfs_fsync_range) from [<c0324294>] torvalds#15 [<c0324294>] (do_fsync) from [<c0324014>] torvalds#16 [<c0324014>] (sys_fsync) from [<c0108bc0>] This can be caused by flush_dirty_inode() in f2fs_sync_node_pages() where iput() requires f2fs_lock_op() again resulting in livelock. Reported-by: Zhiguo Niu <Zhiguo.Niu@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit e89c4a9 upstream. I got the following lockdep splat while testing: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 torvalds#932 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/229626 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff828513f0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 but task is already holding lock: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #7 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #6 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x49/0x480 commit_cowonly_roots+0xb5/0x2a0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x516/0xa60 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #5 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4bb/0xa60 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x43/0x70 start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x42/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640 do_mmap+0x376/0x580 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x68/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 perf_read+0x141/0x2c0 vfs_read+0xad/0x1b0 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 perf_event_init_cpu+0x88/0x150 perf_event_init+0x1db/0x20b start_kernel+0x3ae/0x53c secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 -> #1 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 perf_event_init_cpu+0x4f/0x150 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xb1/0x900 _cpu_up.constprop.26+0x9f/0x130 cpu_up+0x7b/0xc0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60 smp_init+0x26/0x71 kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x258 kernel_init+0xa/0x103 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex --> &fs_info->scrub_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by btrfs/229626: #0: ffff88bfe8bb86e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0xbd/0x630 #1: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630 stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 229626 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 torvalds#932 Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x165/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0 ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630 ? start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0 ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xca/0x160 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250 ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This happens because we're allocating the scrub workqueues under the scrub and device list mutex, which brings in a whole host of other dependencies. Because the work queue allocation is done with GFP_KERNEL, it can trigger reclaim, which can lead to a transaction commit, which in turns needs the device_list_mutex, it can lead to a deadlock. A different problem for which this fix is a solution. Fix this by moving the actual allocation outside of the scrub lock, and then only take the lock once we're ready to actually assign them to the fs_info. We'll now have to cleanup the workqueues in a few more places, so I've added a helper to do the refcount dance to safely free the workqueues. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8a39e8c ] When compiling with DEBUG=1 on Fedora 32 I'm getting crash for 'perf test signal': Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000c68548 in __test_function () (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000c68548 in __test_function () #1 0x00000000004d62e9 in test_function () at tests/bp_signal.c:61 #2 0x00000000004d689a in test__bp_signal (test=0xa8e280 <generic_ ... #3 0x00000000004b7d49 in run_test (test=0xa8e280 <generic_tests+1 ... #4 0x00000000004b7e7f in test_and_print (t=0xa8e280 <generic_test ... #5 0x00000000004b8927 in __cmd_test (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdce0, ... ... It's caused by the symbol __test_function being in the ".bss" section: $ readelf -a ./perf | less [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [28] .bss NOBITS 0000000000c356a0 008346a0 00000000000511f8 0000000000000000 WA 0 0 32 $ nm perf | grep __test_function 0000000000c68548 B __test_function I guess most of the time we're just lucky the inline asm ended up in the ".text" section, so making it specific explicit with push and pop section clauses. $ readelf -a ./perf | less [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [13] .text PROGBITS 0000000000431240 00031240 0000000000306faa 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 16 $ nm perf | grep __test_function 00000000004d62c8 T __test_function Committer testing: $ readelf -wi ~/bin/perf | grep producer -m1 <c> DW_AT_producer : (indirect string, offset: 0x254a): GNU C99 10.2.1 20200723 (Red Hat 10.2.1-1) -mtune=generic -march=x86-64 -ggdb3 -std=gnu99 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -funwind-tables -fstack-protector-all ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ $ Before: $ perf test signal 20: Breakpoint overflow signal handler : FAILED! $ After: $ perf test signal 20: Breakpoint overflow signal handler : Ok $ Fixes: 8fd34e1 ("perf test: Improve bp_signal") Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200911130005.1842138-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 22fe5a2 ] The aliases were never released causing the following leaks: Indirect leak of 1224 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7feefb830628 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x107628) #1 0x56332c8f1b62 in __perf_pmu__new_alias util/pmu.c:322 #2 0x56332c8f401f in pmu_add_cpu_aliases_map util/pmu.c:778 #3 0x56332c792ce9 in __test__pmu_event_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:295 #4 0x56332c792ce9 in test_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:367 #5 0x56332c76a09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410 #6 0x56332c76a09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440 #7 0x56332c76ce69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695 #8 0x56332c76ce69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807 #9 0x56332c7d2214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312 torvalds#10 0x56332c6701a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364 torvalds#11 0x56332c6701a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408 torvalds#12 0x56332c6701a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538 torvalds#13 0x7feefb359cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Fixes: 956a783 ("perf test: Test pmu-events aliases") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-11-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b12eea5 ] The evsel->unit borrows a pointer of pmu event or alias instead of owns a string. But tool event (duration_time) passes a result of strdup() caused a leak. It was found by ASAN during metric test: Direct leak of 210 byte(s) in 70 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fe366fca0b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5) #1 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in add_event_tool util/parse-events.c:414 #2 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in parse_events_add_tool util/parse-events.c:1414 #3 0x559fbbd8474d in parse_events_parse util/parse-events.y:439 #4 0x559fbbcc95da in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:2096 #5 0x559fbbcc95da in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2141 #6 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:406 #7 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:393 #8 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_cpu tests/pmu-events.c:415 #9 0x559fbbc28555 in test_parsing tests/pmu-events.c:498 torvalds#10 0x559fbbc0109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410 torvalds#11 0x559fbbc0109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440 torvalds#12 0x559fbbc03e69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695 torvalds#13 0x559fbbc03e69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807 torvalds#14 0x559fbbc691f4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312 torvalds#15 0x559fbbb071a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364 torvalds#16 0x559fbbb071a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408 torvalds#17 0x559fbbb071a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538 torvalds#18 0x7fe366b68cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Fixes: f0fbb11 ("perf stat: Implement duration_time as a proper event") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-6-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d26383d ] The following leaks were detected by ASAN: Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fecc305180e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e) #1 0x560578f6dce5 in perf_pmu__new_format util/pmu.c:1333 #2 0x560578f752fc in perf_pmu_parse util/pmu.y:59 #3 0x560578f6a8b7 in perf_pmu__format_parse util/pmu.c:73 #4 0x560578e07045 in test__pmu tests/pmu.c:155 #5 0x560578de109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410 #6 0x560578de109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440 #7 0x560578de401a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661 #8 0x560578de401a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807 #9 0x560578e49354 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312 torvalds#10 0x560578ce71a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364 torvalds#11 0x560578ce71a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408 torvalds#12 0x560578ce71a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538 torvalds#13 0x7fecc2b7acc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 Fixes: cff7f95 ("perf tests: Move pmu tests into separate object") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-12-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a466c85 ] When closing and freeing the source device we could end up doing our final blkdev_put() on the bdev, which will grab the bd_mutex. As such we want to be holding as few locks as possible, so move this call outside of the dev_replace->lock_finishing_cancel_unmount lock. Since we're modifying the fs_devices we need to make sure we're holding the uuid_mutex here, so take that as well. There's a report from syzbot probably hitting one of the cases where the bd_mutex and device_list_mutex are taken in the wrong order, however it's not with device replace, like this patch fixes. As there's no reproducer available so far, we can't verify the fix. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000fc04d105afcf86d7@google.com/ dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=84a0634dc5d21d488419 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/6878 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804c17d780 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 btrfs_finish_chunk_alloc+0x281/0xf90 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5255 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2f3/0x700 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2109 __btrfs_end_transaction+0xf5/0x690 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:916 find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3807 [inline] find_free_extent+0x23b7/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127 btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206 cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838 writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439 __extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653 extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249 extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370 do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352 __writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461 writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721 wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline] wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080 process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 -> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] __sb_start_write+0x234/0x470 fs/super.c:1672 sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1690 [inline] start_transaction+0xbe7/0x1170 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:624 find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3789 [inline] find_free_extent+0x25e1/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127 btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206 cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838 writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439 __extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653 extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249 extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370 do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352 __writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461 writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721 wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline] wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080 process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 -> #2 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __flush_work+0x60e/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3041 wb_shutdown+0x180/0x220 mm/backing-dev.c:355 bdi_unregister+0x174/0x590 mm/backing-dev.c:872 del_gendisk+0x820/0xa10 block/genhd.c:933 loop_remove drivers/block/loop.c:2192 [inline] loop_control_ioctl drivers/block/loop.c:2291 [inline] loop_control_ioctl+0x3b1/0x480 drivers/block/loop.c:2257 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (loop_ctl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 lo_open+0x19/0xd0 drivers/block/loop.c:1893 __blkdev_get+0x759/0x1aa0 fs/block_dev.c:1507 blkdev_get fs/block_dev.c:1639 [inline] blkdev_open+0x227/0x300 fs/block_dev.c:1753 do_dentry_open+0x4b9/0x11b0 fs/open.c:817 do_open fs/namei.c:3251 [inline] path_openat+0x1b9a/0x2730 fs/namei.c:3368 do_filp_open+0x17e/0x3c0 fs/namei.c:3395 do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1168 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline] __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1192 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1188 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1188 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426 lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804 btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline] btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline] btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline] close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161 close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline] btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179 close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149 generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464 kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108 btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265 deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335 deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366 cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &bdev->bd_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&bdev->bd_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.0/6878: #0: ffff88809070c0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#70){++++}-{3:3}, at: deactivate_super+0xa5/0xd0 fs/super.c:365 #1: ffffffff8a5b37a8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_close_devices+0x23/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1178 #2: ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 6878 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118 check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426 lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103 blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804 btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline] btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline] btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline] close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161 close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline] btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179 close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149 generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464 kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108 btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265 deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335 deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366 cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x460027 RSP: 002b:00007fff59216328 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000076035 RCX: 0000000000460027 RDX: 0000000000403188 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fff592163d0 RBP: 0000000000000333 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000b R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff59217460 R13: 0000000002df2a60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff59217460 Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> [ add syzbot reference ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2f58866 ] Fix warning caused by lockdep_assert_held when CONFIG_LOCKDEP is enabled. [ 271.940647] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 0 at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/hal.c:818 ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin+0x31/0x40 [ath11k] [ 271.940655] Modules linked in: qrtr_mhi qrtr ns ath11k_pci mhi ath11k qmi_helpers nvme nvme_core [ 271.940675] CPU: 6 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/6 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc5-kalle-bringup-wt-ath+ #4 [ 271.940682] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 7590/08717F, BIOS 1.3.0 07/22/2019 [ 271.940698] RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin+0x31/0x40 [ath11k] [ 271.940708] Code: 48 89 f3 85 c0 75 11 48 8b 83 a8 00 00 00 8b 00 89 83 b0 00 00 00 5b c3 48 8d 7e 58 be ff ff ff ff e8 53 24 ec fa 85 c0 75 dd <0f> 0b eb d9 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 53 48 89 f3 8b 35 [ 271.940718] RSP: 0018:ffffbdf0c0230df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 271.940727] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa12b34e67680 RCX: ffffa12b57a0d800 [ 271.940735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffffa12b34e676d8 [ 271.940742] RBP: ffffa12b34e60000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 271.940753] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000046 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 271.940763] R13: ffffa12b34e60000 R14: ffffa12b34e60000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 271.940774] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa12b5a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 271.940788] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 271.940798] CR2: 00007f8bef282008 CR3: 00000001f4224004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 271.940805] Call Trace: [ 271.940813] <IRQ> [ 271.940835] ath11k_dp_tx_completion_handler+0x9e/0x950 [ath11k] [ 271.940847] ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x3b0 [ 271.940876] ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x5a/0x2e0 [ath11k] [ 271.940893] ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x1e/0x80 [ath11k_pci] [ 271.940908] net_rx_action+0x283/0x4f0 [ 271.940931] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x499 [ 271.940950] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20 [ 271.940963] </IRQ> [ 271.940979] do_softirq_own_stack+0x4d/0x60 [ 271.940991] irq_exit_rcu+0xb0/0xc0 [ 271.941001] common_interrupt+0xce/0x190 [ 271.941014] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 [ 271.941026] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0x115/0x500 Tested-on: QCA6390 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HST.1.0.1-01740-QCAHSTSWPLZ_V2_TO_X86-1 Signed-off-by: Carl Huang <cjhuang@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1601463073-12106-5-git-send-email-kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit ca10845 upstream. While running btrfs/061, btrfs/073, btrfs/078, or btrfs/178 we hit the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/100 is trying to acquire lock: ffff96ecc22ef4a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x65/0x80 slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x20/0x200 kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0x270 alloc_inode+0x82/0xb0 iget_locked+0x10d/0x2c0 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x240 sysfs_get_tree+0x16/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x434/0xc00 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150 kernfs_create_link+0x63/0xa0 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x81/0x130 btrfs_init_new_device+0x67f/0x1250 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ef/0x2e20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x125/0x3a0 find_free_extent+0xdf6/0x1210 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb0/0x310 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11a/0x530 btrfs_cow_block+0x104/0x220 btrfs_search_slot+0x52e/0x9d0 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xb0 btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x90/0x4f0 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x93/0x140 btrfs_log_inode+0x5de/0x2020 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x429/0xc90 btrfs_log_new_name+0x95/0x9b btrfs_rename2+0xbb9/0x1800 vfs_rename+0x64f/0x9f0 do_renameat2+0x320/0x4e0 __x64_sys_rename+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 kthread+0x138/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(kernfs_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/100: #0: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8dd65c50 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x115/0x290 #2: ffff96ed2ade30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#36){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1e0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb8 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x50 ? add_wait_queue_exclusive+0x70/0x70 ? balance_pgdat+0x670/0x670 kthread+0x138/0x160 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This happens because we are holding the chunk_mutex at the time of adding in a new device. However we only need to hold the device_list_mutex, as we're going to iterate over the fs_devices devices. Move the sysfs init stuff outside of the chunk_mutex to get rid of this lockdep splat. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x: f3cd2c5: btrfs: sysfs, rename device_link add/remove functions CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 66d204a upstream. Very sporadically I had test case btrfs/069 from fstests hanging (for years, it is not a recent regression), with the following traces in dmesg/syslog: [162301.160628] BTRFS info (device sdc): dev_replace from /dev/sdd (devid 2) to /dev/sdg started [162301.181196] BTRFS info (device sdc): scrub: finished on devid 4 with status: 0 [162301.287162] BTRFS info (device sdc): dev_replace from /dev/sdd (devid 2) to /dev/sdg finished [162513.513792] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:1356167 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.514318] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.514522] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.514747] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid:1356167 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [162513.514751] Call Trace: [162513.514761] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.514765] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.514771] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.514844] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.514850] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.514864] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.514879] transaction_kthread+0xa4/0x170 [btrfs] [162513.514891] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x660/0x660 [btrfs] [162513.514894] kthread+0x153/0x170 [162513.514897] ? kthread_stop+0x2c0/0x2c0 [162513.514902] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [162513.514916] INFO: task fsstress:1356184 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.515192] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.515431] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.515680] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356184 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00004000 [162513.515682] Call Trace: [162513.515688] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.515691] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.515697] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.515712] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.515716] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.515729] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.515743] btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs] [162513.515753] btrfs_sync_fs+0x61/0x1c0 [btrfs] [162513.515758] ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 [162513.515761] iterate_supers+0x87/0xf0 [162513.515765] ksys_sync+0x60/0xb0 [162513.515768] __do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 [162513.515771] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.515774] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.515781] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f50bd7 [162513.515782] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.515784] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b978e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a2 [162513.515786] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b1fad2c560 RCX: 00007f5238f50bd7 [162513.515788] RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000000daf0e74 RDI: 000000000000003a [162513.515789] RBP: 0000000000000032 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007f5239019be0 [162513.515791] R10: fffffffffffff24f R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000000003a [162513.515792] R13: 00007fff67b97950 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1a340 [162513.515804] INFO: task fsstress:1356185 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.516064] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.516329] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.516617] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356185 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00000000 [162513.516620] Call Trace: [162513.516625] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.516628] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.516634] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.516647] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.516650] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.516662] start_transaction+0x4d7/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.516679] btrfs_setxattr_trans+0x3c/0x100 [btrfs] [162513.516686] __vfs_setxattr+0x66/0x80 [162513.516691] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x70/0x200 [162513.516697] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x120 [162513.516703] setxattr+0x125/0x240 [162513.516709] ? lock_acquire+0xb1/0x480 [162513.516712] ? mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.516721] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x8e/0xb0 [162513.516723] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [162513.516725] ? __sb_start_write+0x19b/0x290 [162513.516727] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [162513.516732] path_setxattr+0xba/0xd0 [162513.516739] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x27/0x30 [162513.516741] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.516743] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.516745] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f56d5a [162513.516746] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.516748] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b97868 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [162513.516750] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f5238f56d5a [162513.516751] RDX: 000055b1fbb0d5a0 RSI: 00007fff67b978a0 RDI: 000055b1fbb0d470 [162513.516753] RBP: 000055b1fbb0d5a0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff67b97700 [162513.516754] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 [162513.516756] R13: 0000000000000024 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fff67b978a0 [162513.516767] INFO: task fsstress:1356196 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.517064] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.517365] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.517763] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356196 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00004000 [162513.517780] Call Trace: [162513.517786] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.517789] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.517796] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.517810] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.517814] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.517829] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.517845] btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs] [162513.517857] btrfs_sync_fs+0x61/0x1c0 [btrfs] [162513.517862] ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 [162513.517865] iterate_supers+0x87/0xf0 [162513.517869] ksys_sync+0x60/0xb0 [162513.517872] __do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 [162513.517875] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.517878] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.517881] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f50bd7 [162513.517883] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.517885] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b978e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a2 [162513.517887] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b1fad2c560 RCX: 00007f5238f50bd7 [162513.517889] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007660add2 RDI: 0000000000000053 [162513.517891] RBP: 0000000000000032 R08: 0000000000000067 R09: 00007f5239019be0 [162513.517893] R10: fffffffffffff24f R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000053 [162513.517895] R13: 00007fff67b97950 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1a340 [162513.517908] INFO: task fsstress:1356197 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.518298] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.518672] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.519157] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356197 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00000000 [162513.519160] Call Trace: [162513.519165] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.519168] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.519174] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.519190] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.519193] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.519206] start_transaction+0x4d7/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.519222] btrfs_create+0x57/0x200 [btrfs] [162513.519230] lookup_open+0x522/0x650 [162513.519246] path_openat+0x2b8/0xa50 [162513.519270] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 [162513.519275] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [162513.519280] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [162513.519285] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0 [162513.519287] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [162513.519295] do_sys_openat2+0x20d/0x2d0 [162513.519300] do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 [162513.519304] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.519307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.519309] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f4a903 [162513.519310] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.519312] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b97758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 [162513.519314] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: 00007f5238f4a903 [162513.519316] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000001b6 RDI: 000055b1fbb0d470 [162513.519317] RBP: 00007fff67b978c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000002 [162513.519319] R10: 00007fff67b974f7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000013 [162513.519320] R13: 00000000000001b6 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1c620 [162513.519332] INFO: task btrfs:1356211 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.519727] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.520115] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.520508] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid:1356211 ppid:1356178 flags:0x00004002 [162513.520511] Call Trace: [162513.520516] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.520519] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.520525] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.520544] btrfs_scrub_pause+0x11f/0x180 [btrfs] [162513.520548] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.520562] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x45a/0xc30 [btrfs] [162513.520574] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520596] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6d8/0x711 [btrfs] [162513.520619] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold+0x1cc/0x1fd [btrfs] [162513.520639] btrfs_ioctl+0x2a25/0x36f0 [btrfs] [162513.520643] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520645] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [162513.520648] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520651] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [162513.520655] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [162513.520657] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [162513.520660] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x35/0x50 [162513.520662] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520671] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [162513.520672] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [162513.520677] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.520679] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.520681] RIP: 0033:0x7fc3cd307d87 [162513.520682] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.520684] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30a56bb8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [162513.520686] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fc3cd307d87 [162513.520687] RDX: 00007ffe30a57a30 RSI: 00000000ca289435 RDI: 0000000000000003 [162513.520689] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [162513.520690] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 [162513.520692] R13: 0000557323a212e0 R14: 00007ffe30a5a520 R15: 0000000000000001 [162513.520703] Showing all locks held in the system: [162513.520712] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/54: [162513.520713] #0: ffffffffb40a91a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x15/0x197 [162513.520728] 1 lock held by in:imklog/596: [162513.520729] #0: ffff8f3f0d781400 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0x4d/0x60 [162513.520782] 1 lock held by btrfs-transacti/1356167: [162513.520784] #0: ffff8f3d810cc848 (&fs_info->transaction_kthread_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: transaction_kthread+0x4a/0x170 [btrfs] [162513.520798] 1 lock held by btrfs/1356190: [162513.520800] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x22/0x60 [162513.520805] 1 lock held by fsstress/1356184: [162513.520806] #0: ffff8f3d576440e8 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: iterate_supers+0x6f/0xf0 [162513.520811] 3 locks held by fsstress/1356185: [162513.520812] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.520815] #1: ffff8f3d80a650b8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10){++++}-{3:3}, at: vfs_setxattr+0x50/0x120 [162513.520820] #2: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520833] 1 lock held by fsstress/1356196: [162513.520834] #0: ffff8f3d576440e8 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: iterate_supers+0x6f/0xf0 [162513.520838] 3 locks held by fsstress/1356197: [162513.520839] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.520843] #1: ffff8f3d506465e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10){++++}-{3:3}, at: path_openat+0x2a7/0xa50 [162513.520846] #2: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520858] 2 locks held by btrfs/1356211: [162513.520859] #0: ffff8f3d810cde30 (&fs_info->dev_replace.lock_finishing_cancel_unmount){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x52/0x711 [btrfs] [162513.520877] #1: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] This was weird because the stack traces show that a transaction commit, triggered by a device replace operation, is blocking trying to pause any running scrubs but there are no stack traces of blocked tasks doing a scrub. After poking around with drgn, I noticed there was a scrub task that was constantly running and blocking for shorts periods of time: >>> t = find_task(prog, 1356190) >>> prog.stack_trace(t) #0 __schedule+0x5ce/0xcfc #1 schedule+0x46/0xe4 #2 schedule_timeout+0x1df/0x475 #3 btrfs_reada_wait+0xda/0x132 #4 scrub_stripe+0x2a8/0x112f #5 scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x134 #6 scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x29e/0x5ee #7 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x2d5/0x91b #8 btrfs_ioctl+0x7f5/0x36e7 #9 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 torvalds#10 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x77 torvalds#11 entry_SYSCALL_64+0x7c/0x156 Which corresponds to: int btrfs_reada_wait(void *handle) { struct reada_control *rc = handle; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = rc->fs_info; while (atomic_read(&rc->elems)) { if (!atomic_read(&fs_info->reada_works_cnt)) reada_start_machine(fs_info); wait_event_timeout(rc->wait, atomic_read(&rc->elems) == 0, (HZ + 9) / 10); } (...) So the counter "rc->elems" was set to 1 and never decreased to 0, causing the scrub task to loop forever in that function. Then I used the following script for drgn to check the readahead requests: $ cat dump_reada.py import sys import drgn from drgn import NULL, Object, cast, container_of, execscript, \ reinterpret, sizeof from drgn.helpers.linux import * mnt_path = b"/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1" mnt = None for mnt in for_each_mount(prog, dst = mnt_path): pass if mnt is None: sys.stderr.write(f'Error: mount point {mnt_path} not found\n') sys.exit(1) fs_info = cast('struct btrfs_fs_info *', mnt.mnt.mnt_sb.s_fs_info) def dump_re(re): nzones = re.nzones.value_() print(f're at {hex(re.value_())}') print(f'\t logical {re.logical.value_()}') print(f'\t refcnt {re.refcnt.value_()}') print(f'\t nzones {nzones}') for i in range(nzones): dev = re.zones[i].device name = dev.name.str.string_() print(f'\t\t dev id {dev.devid.value_()} name {name}') print() for _, e in radix_tree_for_each(fs_info.reada_tree): re = cast('struct reada_extent *', e) dump_re(re) $ drgn dump_reada.py re at 0xffff8f3da9d25ad8 logical 38928384 refcnt 1 nzones 1 dev id 0 name b'/dev/sdd' $ So there was one readahead extent with a single zone corresponding to the source device of that last device replace operation logged in dmesg/syslog. Also the ID of that zone's device was 0 which is a special value set in the source device of a device replace operation when the operation finishes (constant BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID set at btrfs_dev_replace_finishing()), confirming again that device /dev/sdd was the source of a device replace operation. Normally there should be as many zones in the readahead extent as there are devices, and I wasn't expecting the extent to be in a block group with a 'single' profile, so I went and confirmed with the following drgn script that there weren't any single profile block groups: $ cat dump_block_groups.py import sys import drgn from drgn import NULL, Object, cast, container_of, execscript, \ reinterpret, sizeof from drgn.helpers.linux import * mnt_path = b"/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1" mnt = None for mnt in for_each_mount(prog, dst = mnt_path): pass if mnt is None: sys.stderr.write(f'Error: mount point {mnt_path} not found\n') sys.exit(1) fs_info = cast('struct btrfs_fs_info *', mnt.mnt.mnt_sb.s_fs_info) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA = (1 << 0) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM = (1 << 1) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA = (1 << 2) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID0 = (1 << 3) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 = (1 << 4) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP = (1 << 5) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10 = (1 << 6) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5 = (1 << 7) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6 = (1 << 8) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C3 = (1 << 9) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C4 = (1 << 10) def bg_flags_string(bg): flags = bg.flags.value_() ret = '' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA: ret = 'data' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA: if len(ret) > 0: ret += '|' ret += 'meta' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM: if len(ret) > 0: ret += '|' ret += 'system' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID0: ret += ' raid0' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1: ret += ' raid1' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP: ret += ' dup' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10: ret += ' raid10' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5: ret += ' raid5' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6: ret += ' raid6' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C3: ret += ' raid1c3' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C4: ret += ' raid1c4' else: ret += ' single' return ret def dump_bg(bg): print() print(f'block group at {hex(bg.value_())}') print(f'\t start {bg.start.value_()} length {bg.length.value_()}') print(f'\t flags {bg.flags.value_()} - {bg_flags_string(bg)}') bg_root = fs_info.block_group_cache_tree.address_of_() for bg in rbtree_inorder_for_each_entry('struct btrfs_block_group', bg_root, 'cache_node'): dump_bg(bg) $ drgn dump_block_groups.py block group at 0xffff8f3d673b0400 start 22020096 length 16777216 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d53ddb400 start 38797312 length 536870912 flags 260 - meta raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d5f4d9c00 start 575668224 length 2147483648 flags 257 - data raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d08189000 start 2723151872 length 67108864 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3db70ff000 start 2790260736 length 1073741824 flags 260 - meta raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d5f4dd800 start 3864002560 length 67108864 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d67037000 start 3931111424 length 2147483648 flags 257 - data raid6 $ So there were only 2 reasons left for having a readahead extent with a single zone: reada_find_zone(), called when creating a readahead extent, returned NULL either because we failed to find the corresponding block group or because a memory allocation failed. With some additional and custom tracing I figured out that on every further ocurrence of the problem the block group had just been deleted when we were looping to create the zones for the readahead extent (at reada_find_extent()), so we ended up with only one zone in the readahead extent, corresponding to a device that ends up getting replaced. So after figuring that out it became obvious why the hang happens: 1) Task A starts a scrub on any device of the filesystem, except for device /dev/sdd; 2) Task B starts a device replace with /dev/sdd as the source device; 3) Task A calls btrfs_reada_add() from scrub_stripe() and it is currently starting to scrub a stripe from block group X. This call to btrfs_reada_add() is the one for the extent tree. When btrfs_reada_add() calls reada_add_block(), it passes the logical address of the extent tree's root node as its 'logical' argument - a value of 38928384; 4) Task A then enters reada_find_extent(), called from reada_add_block(). It finds there isn't any existing readahead extent for the logical address 38928384, so it proceeds to the path of creating a new one. It calls btrfs_map_block() to find out which stripes exist for the block group X. On the first iteration of the for loop that iterates over the stripes, it finds the stripe for device /dev/sdd, so it creates one zone for that device and adds it to the readahead extent. Before getting into the second iteration of the loop, the cleanup kthread deletes block group X because it was empty. So in the iterations for the remaining stripes it does not add more zones to the readahead extent, because the calls to reada_find_zone() returned NULL because they couldn't find block group X anymore. As a result the new readahead extent has a single zone, corresponding to the device /dev/sdd; 4) Before task A returns to btrfs_reada_add() and queues the readahead job for the readahead work queue, task B finishes the device replace and at btrfs_dev_replace_finishing() swaps the device /dev/sdd with the new device /dev/sdg; 5) Task A returns to reada_add_block(), which increments the counter "->elems" of the reada_control structure allocated at btrfs_reada_add(). Then it returns back to btrfs_reada_add() and calls reada_start_machine(). This queues a job in the readahead work queue to run the function reada_start_machine_worker(), which calls __reada_start_machine(). At __reada_start_machine() we take the device list mutex and for each device found in the current device list, we call reada_start_machine_dev() to start the readahead work. However at this point the device /dev/sdd was already freed and is not in the device list anymore. This means the corresponding readahead for the extent at 38928384 is never started, and therefore the "->elems" counter of the reada_control structure allocated at btrfs_reada_add() never goes down to 0, causing the call to btrfs_reada_wait(), done by the scrub task, to wait forever. Note that the readahead request can be made either after the device replace started or before it started, however in pratice it is very unlikely that a device replace is able to start after a readahead request is made and is able to complete before the readahead request completes - maybe only on a very small and nearly empty filesystem. This hang however is not the only problem we can have with readahead and device removals. When the readahead extent has other zones other than the one corresponding to the device that is being removed (either by a device replace or a device remove operation), we risk having a use-after-free on the device when dropping the last reference of the readahead extent. For example if we create a readahead extent with two zones, one for the device /dev/sdd and one for the device /dev/sde: 1) Before the readahead worker starts, the device /dev/sdd is removed, and the corresponding btrfs_device structure is freed. However the readahead extent still has the zone pointing to the device structure; 2) When the readahead worker starts, it only finds device /dev/sde in the current device list of the filesystem; 3) It starts the readahead work, at reada_start_machine_dev(), using the device /dev/sde; 4) Then when it finishes reading the extent from device /dev/sde, it calls __readahead_hook() which ends up dropping the last reference on the readahead extent through the last call to reada_extent_put(); 5) At reada_extent_put() it iterates over each zone of the readahead extent and attempts to delete an element from the device's 'reada_extents' radix tree, resulting in a use-after-free, as the device pointer of the zone for /dev/sdd is now stale. We can also access the device after dropping the last reference of a zone, through reada_zone_release(), also called by reada_extent_put(). And a device remove suffers the same problem, however since it shrinks the device size down to zero before removing the device, it is very unlikely to still have readahead requests not completed by the time we free the device, the only possibility is if the device has a very little space allocated. While the hang problem is exclusive to scrub, since it is currently the only user of btrfs_reada_add() and btrfs_reada_wait(), the use-after-free problem affects any path that triggers readhead, which includes btree_readahead_hook() and __readahead_hook() (a readahead worker can trigger readahed for the children of a node) for example - any path that ends up calling reada_add_block() can trigger the use-after-free after a device is removed. So fix this by waiting for any readahead requests for a device to complete before removing a device, ensuring that while waiting for existing ones no new ones can be made. This problem has been around for a very long time - the readahead code was added in 2011, device remove exists since 2008 and device replace was introduced in 2013, hard to pick a specific commit for a git Fixes tag. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7837fa8 upstream. Dave reported a problem with my rwsem conversion patch where we got the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-default+ #1297 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/76 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9d5d25df2530 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffa40cbba0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x25/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x9c0 alloc_inode+0x81/0x90 iget_locked+0xcd/0x1a0 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x210 sysfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 path_mount+0x70f/0xa80 do_mount+0x75/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150 kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x58/0x80 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x70/0xd0 kobject_add_internal+0xbb/0x2d0 kobject_add+0x7a/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_block_group_type+0x141/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_read_block_groups+0x1f1/0x8c0 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x981/0x1108 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0xe/0xb0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x2d/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x2d/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 path_mount+0x70f/0xa80 do_mount+0x75/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (btrfs-extent-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x6d4/0xfd0 [btrfs] check_committed_ref+0x69/0x200 [btrfs] btrfs_cross_ref_exist+0x65/0xb0 [btrfs] run_delalloc_nocow+0x446/0x9b0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x61/0x6a0 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0xae/0x160 [btrfs] __extent_writepage+0x262/0x420 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2b6/0x510 [btrfs] extent_writepages+0x43/0x90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x40/0xe0 __writeback_single_inode+0x62/0x610 writeback_sb_inodes+0x20f/0x500 wb_writeback+0xef/0x4a0 wb_do_writeback+0x49/0x2e0 wb_workfn+0x81/0x340 process_one_work+0x233/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x6d4/0xfd0 [btrfs] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xc0 [btrfs] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x2c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x7de/0x850 [btrfs] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x8e/0x140 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xbc0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x2db/0x470 [btrfs] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x7b/0xb0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x16f/0x1a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xb0/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xd0b/0x2690 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 validate_chain+0xa6e/0x2a20 __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3cc/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x16d/0x3b0 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x230/0x6a0 balance_pgdat+0x325/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x4d0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(kernfs_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/76: #0: ffffffffa40cbba0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffffa40b8b58 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x54/0x2e0 #2: ffff9d5d322390e8 (&type->s_umount_key#26){++++}-{3:3}, at: trylock_super+0x16/0x50 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 76 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-default+ #1297 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 ? save_trace+0x50/0x470 check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 validate_chain+0xa6e/0x2a20 ? save_trace+0x50/0x470 __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] ? __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x30b/0x560 [btrfs] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3cc/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x16d/0x3b0 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x230/0x6a0 balance_pgdat+0x325/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x4d0 ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 ? balance_pgdat+0x750/0x750 kthread+0x137/0x150 ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This happens because we are still holding the path open when we start adding the sysfs files for the block groups, which creates a dependency on fs_reclaim via the tree lock. Fix this by dropping the path before we start doing anything with sysfs. Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5223cc6 ] When enabling qgroups we walk the tree_root and then add a qgroup item for every root that we have. This creates a lock dependency on the tree_root and qgroup_root, which results in the following lockdep splat (with tree locks using rwsem), eg. in tests btrfs/017 or btrfs/022: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/24552 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9142dfc5f630 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_item+0x6e/0x140 [btrfs] btrfs_create_tree+0x1cb/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0xcd/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by btrfs/24552: #0: ffff9142df431478 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x22/0xa0 #1: ffff9142f9b10cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0x7b/0xe0 [btrfs] #2: ffff9142f9b11a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0x790 [btrfs] #3: ffff9142df431698 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x406/0x510 [btrfs] #4: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 24552 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xc4/0x140 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_root_node+0xd9/0x200 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fix this by dropping the path whenever we find a root item, add the qgroup item, and then re-lookup the root item we found and continue processing roots. Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 6f117cb upstream. When requeueing all requests on the device request queue to the blocklayer we might get to an ERP (error recovery) request that is a copy of an original CQR. Those requests do not have blocklayer request information or a pointer to the dasd_queue set. When trying to access those data it will lead to a null pointer dereference in dasd_requeue_all_requests(). Fix by checking if the request is an ERP request that can simply be ignored. The blocklayer request will be requeued by the original CQR that is on the device queue right behind the ERP request. Fixes: 9487cfd ("s390/dasd: fix handling of internal requests") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.16 Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Hoeppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e773ca7 ] Actually, burst size is equal to '1 << desc->rqcfg.brst_size'. we should use burst size, not desc->rqcfg.brst_size. dma memcpy performance on Rockchip RV1126 @ 1512MHz A7, 1056MHz LPDDR3, 200MHz DMA: dmatest: /# echo dma0chan0 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/channel /# echo 4194304 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/test_buf_size /# echo 8 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/iterations /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/norandom /# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/verbose /# echo 1 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/run dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #1: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #2: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #3: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #4: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #5: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #6: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #7: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #8: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000 Before: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 48 iops 200338 KB/s (0) After this patch: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 179 iops 734873 KB/s (0) After this patch and increase dma clk to 400MHz: dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 259 iops 1062929 KB/s (0) Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605326106-55681-1-git-send-email-sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a0faaa2 ] adapter->tx_scrq and adapter->rx_scrq could be NULL if the previous reset did not complete after freeing sub crqs. Check for NULL before dereferencing them. Snippet of call trace: ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing sub-CRQ ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing CRQ ... ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Got Control IP offload Response ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Re-setting tx_scrq[0] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000003dea7cc Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag tun bridge stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmvnic ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 80 PID: 1856 Comm: kworker/80:2 Tainted: G W 5.8.0+ #4 Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic] NIP: c008000003dea7cc LR: c008000003dea7bc CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000007ef7db860 TRAP: 0380 Tainted: G W (5.8.0+) MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28002422 XER: 0000000d CFAR: c000000000bd9520 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c008000003dea7bc c0000007ef7dbaf0 c008000003df7400 c0000007fa26ec00 GPR04: c0000007fcd0d008 c0000007fcd96350 0000000000000027 c0000007fcd0d010 GPR08: 0000000000000023 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000002000 c00000001ec18e00 c0000000001982f8 c0000007bad6e840 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffef7 GPR24: 0000000000000402 c0000007fa26f3a8 0000000000000003 c00000016f8ec048 GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000007fa26ec00 NIP [c008000003dea7cc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x15c/0x258 [ibmvnic] LR [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic] Call Trace: [c0000007ef7dbaf0] [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic] (unreliable) [c0000007ef7dbb80] [c008000003de8860] __ibmvnic_reset+0x408/0x970 [ibmvnic] [c0000007ef7dbc50] [c00000000018b7cc] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800 [c0000007ef7dbd20] [c00000000018bd78] worker_thread+0x78/0x520 [c0000007ef7dbdb0] [c0000000001984c4] kthread+0x1d4/0x1e0 [c0000007ef7dbe20] [c00000000000cea8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74 Fixes: 57a4943 ("ibmvnic: Reset sub-crqs during driver reset") Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <ljp@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines

1c2fab0

Sometimes you need use the other SPI bus in the device tree due to pin muxing this allows easy references for switching. Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay <mranostay@gmail.com>

koenkooi closed this Nov 26, 2012

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am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines #4

am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines #4

mranostay commented Nov 24, 2012

koenkooi commented Nov 26, 2012

am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines #4

am335x-bone: Add spi0 pins defines #4

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mranostay commented Nov 24, 2012

koenkooi commented Nov 26, 2012