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Whitelist LSM #418

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wants to merge 3 commits into from
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Whitelist LSM #418

wants to merge 3 commits into from

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skx
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@skx skx commented Jun 2, 2017

This is the whitelist LSM, extracted as a pull-request for easy understanding.

I have no particular desire to post it to lkml, but if people are interested in how it works here it is.

root added 3 commits June 2, 2017 19:27
Setup thing such that we can include our new whitelist LSM
a467332 
This just means loading whitelist/ appropriately, when the
menu items are selected.
Add the new whitelist LSM.
3ef11ce 
This adds the functionality to whitelist execution of commands
(to non-root users), based on the presence/absence of xattrs.
Setup whitelist hooks at load-time.
6255802 
This completes the setup & import of the whitelist LSM
@skx skx closed this Jun 2, 2017
wzyy2 pushed a commit to wzyy2/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2017
@rkhuangtao
drm: bridge: dw-hdmi: add more check for HDCP function
13ca991 
On RK3328, dw-hdmi HDCP driver is loaded slower than dw-hdmi.
hdmi->hdcp->hdcp_start is NULL when dw-hdmi call the hdcp_start,
cause following system crash:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
pgd = ffffff8009292000
[00000000] *pgd=000000007e1fe003, *pud=000000007e1fe003, *pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 86000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.70 torvalds#418
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3328 EVB (DT)
task: ffffffc0003a0000 ti: ffffffc0003a8000 task.ti: ffffffc0003a8000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at dw_hdmi_update_power+0xef4/0x1004
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffff800849e778>] pstate: 60000045
sp : ffffffc0003ab3b0
x29: ffffffc0003ab3b0 x28: 000000000000410b
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
x25: ffffffc07770d028 x24: 000000000000410b
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001
x21: 0000000000000002 x20: ffffff8008c02000
x19: ffffff8008c02d90 x18: 0000000062475a46
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 000000000000000e
x15: 0000000000000007 x14: 0ffffffffffffffd
x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0101010101010101
x11: 7f7f7f7f7f7fff7f x10: fefefefeff01f305
x9 : ff7fff7f7f7f7f7f x8 : ffffff80091db5df
x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000004
x5 : 0000000000000015 x4 : 0000000000140b82
x3 : 000000000106b1af x2 : 0000000000000001
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffc076e25e00

Change-Id: I0fccf9d8e06f7acdb56d8e5360acf0df026fee10
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yang <zhengyang@rock-chips.com>
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 1, 2018
@vwax
ARM: 8781/1: Fix Thumb-2 syscall return for binutils 2.29+
afc9f65 
When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the
assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it
automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is
used with ADR.  The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit
manually.  This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state
in the syscall return path:

 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#2] SMP THUMB2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc3+ #8
 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62
 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128
 pc : [<80101004>]    lr : [<801c8a35>]    psr: 60000013
 Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
 Control: 50c5387d  Table: 9e82006a  DAC: 00000051
 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))

 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>:
 80101000:       b672            cpsid   i
 80101002:       f8d9 2008       ldr.w   r2, [r9, #8]
 80101006:       f1b2 4ffe       cmp.w   r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000

 80101184 <local_restart>:
 80101184:       f8d9 a000       ldr.w   sl, [r9]
 80101188:       e92d 0030       stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5}
 8010118c:       f01a 0ff0       tst.w   sl, #240        ; 0xf0
 80101190:       d117            bne.n   801011c2 <__sys_trace>
 80101192:       46ba            mov     sl, r7
 80101194:       f5ba 7fc8       cmp.w   sl, #400        ; 0x190
 80101198:       bf28            it      cs
 8010119a:       f04f 0a00       movcs.w sl, #0
 8010119e:       f3af 8014       nop.w   {20}
 801011a2:       f2af 1ea2       subw    lr, pc, #418    ; 0x1a2

To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it
and use that with badr.  We can't remove the badr usage since that would
would cause breakage with older binutils.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
leitao pushed a commit to leitao/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2018
@vwax @leitao
ARM: 8781/1: Fix Thumb-2 syscall return for binutils 2.29+
aa3f754 
When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the
assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it
automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is
used with ADR.  The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit
manually.  This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state
in the syscall return path:

 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#2] SMP THUMB2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc3+ torvalds#8
 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62
 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128
 pc : [<80101004>]    lr : [<801c8a35>]    psr: 60000013
 Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
 Control: 50c5387d  Table: 9e82006a  DAC: 00000051
 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))

 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>:
 80101000:       b672            cpsid   i
 80101002:       f8d9 2008       ldr.w   r2, [r9, torvalds#8]
 80101006:       f1b2 4ffe       cmp.w   r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000

 80101184 <local_restart>:
 80101184:       f8d9 a000       ldr.w   sl, [r9]
 80101188:       e92d 0030       stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5}
 8010118c:       f01a 0ff0       tst.w   sl, torvalds#240        ; 0xf0
 80101190:       d117            bne.n   801011c2 <__sys_trace>
 80101192:       46ba            mov     sl, r7
 80101194:       f5ba 7fc8       cmp.w   sl, torvalds#400        ; 0x190
 80101198:       bf28            it      cs
 8010119a:       f04f 0a00       movcs.w sl, #0
 8010119e:       f3af 8014       nop.w   {20}
 801011a2:       f2af 1ea2       subw    lr, pc, torvalds#418    ; 0x1a2

To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it
and use that with badr.  We can't remove the badr usage since that would
would cause breakage with older binutils.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Mic92 pushed a commit to Mic92/linux that referenced this pull request Feb 4, 2019
@thehajime
Merge pull request torvalds#418 from motomuman/vnet-header-flag-setti…
fd7bb8a 
…ng-fix

lkl: fix vnet header flag handling with the LKL_VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM
Noltari pushed a commit to Noltari/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 13, 2019
@vwax @gregkh
ARM: 8781/1: Fix Thumb-2 syscall return for binutils 2.29+
88bc59c 
[ Upstream commit afc9f65 ]

When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the
assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it
automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is
used with ADR.  The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit
manually.  This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state
in the syscall return path:

 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#2] SMP THUMB2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc3+ torvalds#8
 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62
 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128
 pc : [<80101004>]    lr : [<801c8a35>]    psr: 60000013
 Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
 Control: 50c5387d  Table: 9e82006a  DAC: 00000051
 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))

 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>:
 80101000:       b672            cpsid   i
 80101002:       f8d9 2008       ldr.w   r2, [r9, torvalds#8]
 80101006:       f1b2 4ffe       cmp.w   r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000

 80101184 <local_restart>:
 80101184:       f8d9 a000       ldr.w   sl, [r9]
 80101188:       e92d 0030       stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5}
 8010118c:       f01a 0ff0       tst.w   sl, torvalds#240        ; 0xf0
 80101190:       d117            bne.n   801011c2 <__sys_trace>
 80101192:       46ba            mov     sl, r7
 80101194:       f5ba 7fc8       cmp.w   sl, torvalds#400        ; 0x190
 80101198:       bf28            it      cs
 8010119a:       f04f 0a00       movcs.w sl, #0
 8010119e:       f3af 8014       nop.w   {20}
 801011a2:       f2af 1ea2       subw    lr, pc, torvalds#418    ; 0x1a2

To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it
and use that with badr.  We can't remove the badr usage since that would
would cause breakage with older binutils.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2019
@vwax @gregkh
ARM: 8781/1: Fix Thumb-2 syscall return for binutils 2.29+
8256eef 
[ Upstream commit afc9f65 ]

When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the
assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it
automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is
used with ADR.  The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit
manually.  This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state
in the syscall return path:

 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [jwrdegoede#2] SMP THUMB2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc3+ linux-sunxi#8
 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62
 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128
 pc : [<80101004>]    lr : [<801c8a35>]    psr: 60000013
 Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
 Control: 50c5387d  Table: 9e82006a  DAC: 00000051
 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))

 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>:
 80101000:       b672            cpsid   i
 80101002:       f8d9 2008       ldr.w   r2, [r9, linux-sunxi#8]
 80101006:       f1b2 4ffe       cmp.w   r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000

 80101184 <local_restart>:
 80101184:       f8d9 a000       ldr.w   sl, [r9]
 80101188:       e92d 0030       stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5}
 8010118c:       f01a 0ff0       tst.w   sl, linux-sunxi#240        ; 0xf0
 80101190:       d117            bne.n   801011c2 <__sys_trace>
 80101192:       46ba            mov     sl, r7
 80101194:       f5ba 7fc8       cmp.w   sl, torvalds#400        ; 0x190
 80101198:       bf28            it      cs
 8010119a:       f04f 0a00       movcs.w sl, #0
 8010119e:       f3af 8014       nop.w   {20}
 801011a2:       f2af 1ea2       subw    lr, pc, torvalds#418    ; 0x1a2

To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it
and use that with badr.  We can't remove the badr usage since that would
would cause breakage with older binutils.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tobetter pushed a commit to tobetter/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 17, 2019
@vwax @tobetter
ARM: 8781/1: Fix Thumb-2 syscall return for binutils 2.29+
96fe919 
[ Upstream commit afc9f65 ]

When building the kernel as Thumb-2 with binutils 2.29 or newer, if the
assembler has seen the .type directive (via ENDPROC()) for a symbol, it
automatically handles the setting of the lowest bit when the symbol is
used with ADR.  The badr macro on the other hand handles this lowest bit
manually.  This leads to a jump to a wrong address in the wrong state
in the syscall return path:

 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#2] SMP THUMB2
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 652 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc3+ #8
 PC is at ret_fast_syscall+0x4/0x62
 LR is at sys_brk+0x109/0x128
 pc : [<80101004>]    lr : [<801c8a35>]    psr: 60000013
 Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
 Control: 50c5387d  Table: 9e82006a  DAC: 00000051
 Process modprobe (pid: 652, stack limit = 0x(ptrval))

 80101000 <ret_fast_syscall>:
 80101000:       b672            cpsid   i
 80101002:       f8d9 2008       ldr.w   r2, [r9, #8]
 80101006:       f1b2 4ffe       cmp.w   r2, #2130706432 ; 0x7f000000

 80101184 <local_restart>:
 80101184:       f8d9 a000       ldr.w   sl, [r9]
 80101188:       e92d 0030       stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5}
 8010118c:       f01a 0ff0       tst.w   sl, torvalds#240        ; 0xf0
 80101190:       d117            bne.n   801011c2 <__sys_trace>
 80101192:       46ba            mov     sl, r7
 80101194:       f5ba 7fc8       cmp.w   sl, torvalds#400        ; 0x190
 80101198:       bf28            it      cs
 8010119a:       f04f 0a00       movcs.w sl, #0
 8010119e:       f3af 8014       nop.w   {20}
 801011a2:       f2af 1ea2       subw    lr, pc, torvalds#418    ; 0x1a2

To fix this, add a new symbol name which doesn't have ENDPROC used on it
and use that with badr.  We can't remove the badr usage since that would
would cause breakage with older binutils.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 12, 2021
@intel-lab-lkp
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in odm.h
3b7b1fb 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#95: FILE: hal/odm.h:95:
    +typedef struct _Rate_Adaptive_Table_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#99: FILE: hal/odm.h:99:
    +typedef struct _RX_High_Power_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#129: FILE: hal/odm.h:129:
    +typedef struct _SW_Antenna_Switch_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#181: FILE: hal/odm.h:181:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RATE_ADAPTIVE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#280: FILE: hal/odm.h:280:
    +typedef enum tag_Dynamic_ODM_Support_Ability_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#300: FILE: hal/odm.h:300:
    +typedef struct _ODM_STA_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/odm.h:328:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Common_Info_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#418: FILE: hal/odm.h:418:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Support_Ability_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#449: FILE: hal/odm.h:449:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_Interface_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/odm.h:455:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_IC_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#460: FILE: hal/odm.h:460:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Cut_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#475: FILE: hal/odm.h:475:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Fab_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#484: FILE: hal/odm.h:484:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Path_Bit_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#495: FILE: hal/odm.h:495:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#516: FILE: hal/odm.h:516:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_MAC_PHY_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#522: FILE: hal/odm.h:522:
    +typedef enum tag_BT_Coexist_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#530: FILE: hal/odm.h:530:
    +typedef enum tag_Operation_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#543: FILE: hal/odm.h:543:
    +typedef enum tag_Wireless_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#555: FILE: hal/odm.h:555:
    +typedef enum tag_Band_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#563: FILE: hal/odm.h:563:
    +typedef enum tag_Secondary_Channel_Offset_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#570: FILE: hal/odm.h:570:
    +typedef enum tag_Security_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#582: FILE: hal/odm.h:582:
    +typedef enum tag_Bandwidth_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#593: FILE: hal/odm.h:593:
    +typedef enum tag_Board_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#605: FILE: hal/odm.h:605:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Package_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#612: FILE: hal/odm.h:612:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GPA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#617: FILE: hal/odm.h:617:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_APA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#622: FILE: hal/odm.h:622:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GLNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#629: FILE: hal/odm.h:629:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_ALNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#637: FILE: hal/odm.h:637:
    +typedef enum tag_CCA_Path {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#643: FILE: hal/odm.h:643:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RA_Info_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#675: FILE: hal/odm.h:675:
    +typedef struct _IQK_MATRIX_REGS_SETTING {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#683: FILE: hal/odm.h:683:
    +typedef struct ODM_RF_Calibration_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #788: FILE: hal/odm.h:788:
    +typedef struct _FAST_ANTENNA_TRAINNING_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#828: FILE: hal/odm.h:828:
    +typedef enum _FAT_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#833: FILE: hal/odm.h:833:
    +typedef enum _ANT_DIV_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#843: FILE: hal/odm.h:843:
    +typedef struct _ODM_PATH_DIVERSITY_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#852: FILE: hal/odm.h:852:
    +typedef enum _BASEBAND_CONFIG_PHY_REG_PG_VALUE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#860: FILE: hal/odm.h:860:
    +typedef struct _ANT_DETECTED_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#870: FILE: hal/odm.h:870:
    +typedef  struct DM_Out_Source_Dynamic_Mechanism_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1229: FILE: hal/odm.h:1229:
    + typedef enum _ODM_RF_CONTENT {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1236: FILE: hal/odm.h:1236:
    +typedef enum _ODM_BB_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1246: FILE: hal/odm.h:1246:
    +typedef enum _ODM_RF_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1251: FILE: hal/odm.h:1251:
    +typedef enum _ODM_FW_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1262: FILE: hal/odm.h:1262:
    +typedef enum _RT_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1319: FILE: hal/odm.h:1319:
    +typedef enum tag_1R_CCA_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1325: FILE: hal/odm.h:1325:
    +typedef enum tag_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1334: FILE: hal/odm.h:1334:
    +typedef enum tag_SW_Antenna_Switch_Definition {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 13, 2021
@gregkh
staging: rtl8723bs: remove typedefs in odm.h
694a76b 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl warnings:

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#95: FILE: hal/odm.h:95:
    +typedef struct _Rate_Adaptive_Table_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#99: FILE: hal/odm.h:99:
    +typedef struct _RX_High_Power_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#129: FILE: hal/odm.h:129:
    +typedef struct _SW_Antenna_Switch_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#181: FILE: hal/odm.h:181:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RATE_ADAPTIVE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#280: FILE: hal/odm.h:280:
    +typedef enum tag_Dynamic_ODM_Support_Ability_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#300: FILE: hal/odm.h:300:
    +typedef struct _ODM_STA_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#328: FILE: hal/odm.h:328:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Common_Info_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#418: FILE: hal/odm.h:418:
    +typedef enum _ODM_Support_Ability_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#449: FILE: hal/odm.h:449:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_Interface_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#455: FILE: hal/odm.h:455:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Support_IC_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#460: FILE: hal/odm.h:460:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Cut_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#475: FILE: hal/odm.h:475:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Fab_Version_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#484: FILE: hal/odm.h:484:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Path_Bit_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#495: FILE: hal/odm.h:495:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#516: FILE: hal/odm.h:516:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_MAC_PHY_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#522: FILE: hal/odm.h:522:
    +typedef enum tag_BT_Coexist_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#530: FILE: hal/odm.h:530:
    +typedef enum tag_Operation_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#543: FILE: hal/odm.h:543:
    +typedef enum tag_Wireless_Mode_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#555: FILE: hal/odm.h:555:
    +typedef enum tag_Band_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#563: FILE: hal/odm.h:563:
    +typedef enum tag_Secondary_Channel_Offset_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#570: FILE: hal/odm.h:570:
    +typedef enum tag_Security_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#582: FILE: hal/odm.h:582:
    +typedef enum tag_Bandwidth_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#593: FILE: hal/odm.h:593:
    +typedef enum tag_Board_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#605: FILE: hal/odm.h:605:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_Package_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#612: FILE: hal/odm.h:612:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GPA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#617: FILE: hal/odm.h:617:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_APA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#622: FILE: hal/odm.h:622:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_GLNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#629: FILE: hal/odm.h:629:
    +typedef enum tag_ODM_TYPE_ALNA_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#637: FILE: hal/odm.h:637:
    +typedef enum tag_CCA_Path {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#643: FILE: hal/odm.h:643:
    +typedef struct _ODM_RA_Info_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#675: FILE: hal/odm.h:675:
    +typedef struct _IQK_MATRIX_REGS_SETTING {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#683: FILE: hal/odm.h:683:
    +typedef struct ODM_RF_Calibration_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #788: FILE: hal/odm.h:788:
    +typedef struct _FAST_ANTENNA_TRAINNING_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#828: FILE: hal/odm.h:828:
    +typedef enum _FAT_STATE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#833: FILE: hal/odm.h:833:
    +typedef enum _ANT_DIV_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#843: FILE: hal/odm.h:843:
    +typedef struct _ODM_PATH_DIVERSITY_ {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#852: FILE: hal/odm.h:852:
    +typedef enum _BASEBAND_CONFIG_PHY_REG_PG_VALUE_TYPE {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#860: FILE: hal/odm.h:860:
    +typedef struct _ANT_DETECTED_INFO {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    torvalds#870: FILE: hal/odm.h:870:
    +typedef  struct DM_Out_Source_Dynamic_Mechanism_Structure {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1229: FILE: hal/odm.h:1229:
    + typedef enum _ODM_RF_CONTENT {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1236: FILE: hal/odm.h:1236:
    +typedef enum _ODM_BB_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1246: FILE: hal/odm.h:1246:
    +typedef enum _ODM_RF_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1251: FILE: hal/odm.h:1251:
    +typedef enum _ODM_FW_Config_Type {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1262: FILE: hal/odm.h:1262:
    +typedef enum _RT_STATUS {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1319: FILE: hal/odm.h:1319:
    +typedef enum tag_1R_CCA_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1325: FILE: hal/odm.h:1325:
    +typedef enum tag_RF_Type_Definition {

    WARNING: do not add new typedefs
    #1334: FILE: hal/odm.h:1334:
    +typedef enum tag_SW_Antenna_Switch_Definition {

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marco.cesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312082638.25512-4-marco.cesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2021
@intel-lab-lkp
Staging: rtl8723bs: fix spaces in odm_HWConfig.c
b17ca9c 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#26: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:26:
    +s32 odm_SignalScaleMapping(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, s32 CurrSig)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#80: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:80:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#93: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:93:
    +	struct PHY_STATUS_RPT_8192CD_T * pPhyStaRpt = (struct PHY_STATUS_RPT_8192CD_T *)pPhyStatus;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#250: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:250:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, struct odm_phy_info *pPhyInfo, struct odm_packet_info *pPktinfo

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#404: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:404:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#418: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:418:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#434: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:434:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #453: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:453:
    +enum HAL_STATUS ODM_ConfigRFWithTxPwrTrackHeaderFile(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#468: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:468:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, enum ODM_BB_Config_Type ConfigType

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2021
@gregkh
Staging: rtl8723bs: fix spaces in odm_HWConfig.c
1b4495f 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#26: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:26:
    +s32 odm_SignalScaleMapping(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, s32 CurrSig)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#80: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:80:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#93: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:93:
    +	struct PHY_STATUS_RPT_8192CD_T * pPhyStaRpt = (struct PHY_STATUS_RPT_8192CD_T *)pPhyStatus;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#250: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:250:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, struct odm_phy_info *pPhyInfo, struct odm_packet_info *pPktinfo

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#404: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:404:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#418: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:418:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#434: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:434:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #453: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:453:
    +enum HAL_STATUS ODM_ConfigRFWithTxPwrTrackHeaderFile(struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#468: FILE: ./hal/odm_HWConfig.c:468:
    +	struct DM_ODM_T * pDM_Odm, enum ODM_BB_Config_Type ConfigType

Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315170618.2566-28-marcocesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 19, 2021
@dcaratti @intel-lab-lkp
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
45d38a1 
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 19, 2021
@dcaratti @intel-lab-lkp
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
103ced5 
when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2021
@dcaratti @intel-lab-lkp
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
07cbe22 
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2021
@dcaratti @intel-lab-lkp
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
fe64af5 
when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2021
@dcaratti @davem330
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
7c0ea59 
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2021
@dcaratti @davem330
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
31fe34a 
when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
zandrey referenced this pull request in zandrey/linux-fslc May 11, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
a147837 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ Freescale#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
zandrey referenced this pull request in zandrey/linux-fslc May 11, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
490ad0a 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ Freescale#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
eac04cf 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
e2a17ba 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
ee4eac8 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
93fc604 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
zandrey referenced this pull request in zandrey/linux-fslc May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
b3502b0 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ Freescale#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
zandrey referenced this pull request in zandrey/linux-fslc May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
8e6dfb7 
commit 31fe34a upstream.

when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ Freescale#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
damentz pushed a commit to zen-kernel/zen-kernel that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
d841d3c 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
damentz pushed a commit to zen-kernel/zen-kernel that referenced this pull request May 12, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
018bb8d 
commit 31fe34a upstream.

when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 13, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
48355e6 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 13, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
d9dd969 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 13, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
2c0922a 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 13, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
7c325ec 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
hamadmarri pushed a commit to hamadmarri/linux that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
@dcaratti @xanmod
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
c40283f 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
hamadmarri pushed a commit to hamadmarri/linux that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
@dcaratti @xanmod
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
a76a61e 
commit 31fe34a upstream.

when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 17, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
ae8c180 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 17, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
6303eb9 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 17, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
0971e26 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 17, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
5740526 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 18, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
bb038e6 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 18, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
1f878b4 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 18, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
a897e96 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 18, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
da36df9 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 21, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
24c627f 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 21, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
f685eb3 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 21, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
256df46 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 21, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
99d741b 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
b1d7280 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
23e17ec 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
5a52fa8 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mrchapp pushed a commit to mrchapp/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2021
@dcaratti @gregkh
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
df9e900 
commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jackpot51 pushed a commit to pop-os/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 22, 2021
@dcaratti @smb49
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
88e37cd 
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1928857

commit 7c0ea59 upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
jackpot51 pushed a commit to pop-os/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 22, 2021
@dcaratti @smb49
net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
c575921 
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1928857

commit 31fe34a upstream.

when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947

 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
  tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
  tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
  fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
  tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
  __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
  net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
  do_softirq+0x71/0x90
  </IRQ>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
  ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
  ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
  __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
  ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
  ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
  raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
  sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
  __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
 Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
 RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
 raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
                                                              ^
  ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2

for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: c129412 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
ojeda added a commit to ojeda/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2021
@ojeda
Merge pull request torvalds#418 from ojeda/deny
8f77a98 
Globally deny Clippy and `rust_2018_idioms`
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