FIP-0036 Draft Update with Latest Parameters #438
Merged
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Revised final draft of FIP for community consideration. Includes changes reflective of community feedback and further CEL analysis and modeling: - SDM Function of slope 1 - InitialPledge calculation with 50% multiplier
vkalghatgi
requested review from
momack2,
arajasek,
jennijuju,
kaitlin-beegle and
anorth
as code owners
anorth
approved these changes
Aug 19, 2022
| - This policy will apply at Sector Upgrade and Extension. | ||
|
|
||
| ## Problem Motivation | ||
| Currently, storage providers do not receive any additional compensation or incentive for committing longer term sectors (whether that be CC or storage deals) to the network. The protocol places equal value on 180 to 540 day sectors in terms of storage mining rewards. However, in making an upfront commitment to longer term sectors, storage providers take on additional operational risks (more can go wrong in a longer time period), and lock rewards for longer. Furthermore, in committing longer term sectors/deals, storage providers demonstrate their long-term commitment to the mission and growth of the Filecoin Network, and are more aligned with client preference for persistent storage. Therefore, the added value of longer-term sector commitments, coupled with the compounded operational/liquidity risks storage providers incur for longer term sectors should be compensated for in the form of increased rewards. | ||
|
|
||
| From a macroeconomic perspective, incentives to seal for longer durations affect the circulating supply dynamics of the network, since collateral is locked for longer. As the network exists in its current state, the percentage of FIL locked on the network is more likely to decline. This FIP looks to introduce more favorable percentage locked value dynamics, while simultaneously ensuring that this increase in locking contributes to network utility, stable circulating supply dynamics, and SP profitability and optionality. | ||
|
|
||
| Per the economic preference to increase the percentage value locked, we also propose adjusting the [Initial Consensus Pledge Mutliplier](https://spec.filecoin.io/systems/filecoin_mining/miner_collaterals/) to 40%. The intention is to create long-term aligned total value locked (TVL) dynamics to support stable and predictable conditions for storage provider (SP) returns. We further discuss the problem/change motivation, and explore impacts on SP profitability and network macroeconomics in the CEL analysis brief [here](https://pl-strflt.notion.site/Duration-Changes-FIP-discussion-Analysis-Summary-735ce6685b7946f0a03fc13c3fe271fa). | ||
| Per the economic preference to increase the percentage value locked, we also propose adjusting the [Initial Consensus Pledge Mutliplier](https://spec.filecoin.io/systems/filecoin_mining/miner_collaterals/) to 50%. The intention is to create long-term aligned total value locked (TVL) dynamics to support stable and predictable conditions for storage provider (SP) returns. We further discuss the problem/change motivation, and explore impacts on SP profitability and network macroeconomics in the CEL analysis brief [here](https://pl-strflt.notion.site/Duration-Changes-FIP-discussion-Analysis-Summary-735ce6685b7946f0a03fc13c3fe271fa). Note, this brief focuses on a linear duration multiplier with slope 2, and a change to the SectorInitialConsensusPledge calculation from 30% to 40%. Following community feedback and input, CEL has produced a follow-on analysis brief [here](https://pl-strflt.notion.site/Duration-FIP-revisions-7426f344685940409ac513a0ffcccc86), modeling the current revised parameter choices; mainly, FIP 0036 will now propose a Sector Duration Multiplier function with slope 1, and an increase in the SectorInitialConsensusPledge calculation from 30% to 50%. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Could we please simplify and update resources to only talk about the proposed parameters, not other values? People will get confused.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
yep fair point will do.
| // Sector quality = 1 | ||
| StoragePledge := 0.0098 FIL | ||
| ConsensusPledge := 0.2741 FIL | ||
| PreCommitDeposit := 50 * StoragePledge = 0.4903 FIL |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
I was a little confused by the labelling here. I am taking this to be post-FIP-0034, which is why PCD is the same between the two cases. Perhaps just note that the x50 here comes from that.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Ok - yes can make this clearer where the 50x comes from on the PCD calculation. Note, it is mentioned in the beginning of this section (line 157) that these calculations are being done post FIP-0034
| ``` | ||
| If this scenario is maintained, the adversarial group is expected to exceed 33% of consensus power within 140 days. | ||
|
|
||
| Factors that mitigate this risk are that it’s unlikely a single group could achieve 50% of FIL+ power consistently, and unlikely that the adversarial group exclusively takes up the longer duration sectors with enhanced power multipliers. | ||
|
|
||
| A limitation is that the above calculation assumes the malicious party is starting from 0% of consensus power. If they already control 10%, time to 33% is reduced to approximately 100 days. | ||
|
|
||
| ### Rollout Shock | ||
| Rollout shock could occur if SPs race to extend their commitments and gain a further 10x multiplier. This could be mitigated by gradually increasing the maximum multiplier 1x to 5x during an initial period (e.g. first three months) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Thank you for removing the "could" so that this proposal is concrete. But you can't remove consideration of rollout shock! You can give explanation of forces that would counter it, though.
|
I agree with anorth - Based on the discussion I don’t think the fip is ready to move on to last call - which is what’ a final draft implies, I’d suggest changing the PR title. |
jennijuju
reviewed
Aug 19, 2022
|
I am at some point going to request that you check in the content of all the links to Notion and other external sites into the |
vkalghatgi
changed the title
Retain initial FIP creation date Co-authored-by: Jiaying Wang <42981373+jennijuju@users.noreply.github.com>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Revised draft of FIP for community consideration. Includes changes reflective of community feedback and further CEL analysis and modeling: