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<html>
<head>
<title>Stand: Defining Digital Freedoms In The UK</title>
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<p><A NAME="money"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It's Worth The Money — But It will cost over 1.5 billion</div>
The government's consultation paper tells us "Over a three year period
of developing the systems and a ten year period during which the cards
would be valid, the total cost of a scheme would be around £1.5
billion."
<P>
The history of ID card cost estimates in other countries (notably
Australia and the Philippines) has risen sharply toward the
implementation stage. The government has failed to successfully
implement almost every large IT system it has ever undertaken. David
Blunkett told Parliament: "I agree that it is important to recognise the
past failures of Government technology systems".
<P>
It's a rather large amount of money to waste on something that won't
serve the purpose, don't you think?<p>
<A HREF="/" onClick="self.close(); return false;">back...</A>
<P>
<P><A NAME="compulsary"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It's Not Compulsory — But Everyone Will Have To Have One?</div>
Paragraph 2.12 makes the assurance that the card scheme could not dictate that service providers require the card. Despite this, we believe that central government would find it very difficult not to lay pressure onto public services it controls, such as the NHS and the Inland Revenue, to make use of the card. It stretches belief that, after the investment of large sums of money, the government would not find itself under political pressure to show that the scheme was worthwhile and presenting efficiency savings, no matter how contrived.
And chances are, you'll <A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20020718173533/http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/uk-idcard-faq.html#compulsory">be legally obliged to apply for the card</A>
<P>
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<P>
<A NAME="leak"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It Won't Leak My Information — But How Can You Stop It?</div>
Well, the record sure ain't good thus far. There is no shortage of <A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20020614134143/http://www.techtv.com/cybercrime/privacy/story/0,23008,3387549,00.html">stories about police officers abusing criminal records databases</A>.
<P>
But for our money, the <A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20000307005427/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/integ7.pdf">Home Office's very own report</A>
(PDF) on Police Integrity makes for the most interesting reading.
<BLOCKQUOTE>
THE INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION<BR>
6.6 Most police intelligence is now stored on computers and, with many members of staff
being able to access it through their own terminal, it is a daunting task to try and protect it. To
illustrate the potential problem, the Inspection Team is aware a spot audit in one force revealed
that within 24 hours of the arrest of a high profile criminal for alleged murder, 67 officers
accessed his intelligence record. When interviewed, most acknowledged they did it purely out of
curiosity but it would have been equally possible for an unscrupulous member of staff to leak
the information unlawfully to other criminals or the press.
</BLOCKQUOTE>
If that's the culture right now inside the police regarding *criminal* data,
it doesn't bode well for a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens.
<P>
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<P>
<A NAME="fraud"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It'll Stop Identity Fraud — But It Won't</div>
<p>If the cards have any value whatsoever, then people *will* find a
way to forge them or to acquire them dishonestly; this point is quite
certain. The technology gap between governments and organised crime
worldwide has now narrowed to such an extent that even the most highly
secure cards are available as blanks within weeks of their
introduction. One should bear in mind, also, that criminal use of fake
identity documents does not necessarily involve the use of
counterfeiting techniques. In 1999, a former accountant was charged in
London with obtaining up to 500 passports under false identities; the
scam was merely a manipulation of the primary documentation
procedure.</p>
<p>It is worth considering some inevitable formulæ that apply
across the board to the black-market economy. Wherever governments,
worldwide, have attempted to introduce ID cards, they have always been
based, at least in part, on the aim of eliminating false identity. The
higher the integrity or infallibility of a card, the greater is its
value to criminals and illegal immigrants. A high value card naturally
attracts substantially larger investment in corruption and counterfeit
activity. The equation is simple — a higher value ID document
equates to greater criminal activity. Criminals and terrorists can, in
reality, move much more freely, safely and confidently with several fake
"official" identities than they ever could in a country using multiple
forms of "low value" ID such as birth certificates, as the UK does
currently.</p>
<P>
<A HREF="/" onClick="self.close(); return false;">back...</A>
<P>
<A NAME="immigrants"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It'll Stop Illegal Immigrant Workers — But It Won't</div>
One of the government's suggestions, rather predictably, is that the card might
help combat illegal immigration. Of course, as plenty of people will be
able to enter the country without a card — not least as casual tourists
— this is largely fallacious.
<P>
The perception that people would be able
to enter the UK illegally and to gain employment here, having done so,
is unlikely to be suppressed by the introduction of a card proving
lawful residence. Especially, given that many of the kinds of people who
employ illegal immigrants — individuals seeking cleaners, parts of the
construction industry seeking casual labourers and so on — are not in
the least bit concerned by the legality of such practices and are
unlikely to request their employees' ID cards before offering
employment.
<P>
The mental image of transit vans pulling up to
groups of young men waiting patiently on the kerb-side at dawn and
asking for their ID cards before whisking them off to a construction
site as casual labour is a bit of a giggle, though, you have to admit.
<P>
Black markets, by definition,
operate illegally and have operated since society first tried to
regulate markets; they have little reason to be worried that another
hurdle has been placed in their path. In the same fashion, unscrupulous
employers just wouldn't care whether they have checked their
employees' ID.
<P>
<A HREF="/" onClick="self.close(); return false;">back...</A>
<P>
<A NAME="biometrics"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You Want Biometrics — But Biometrics Don't Work</div>
The government sets itself, in paragraph 5.21, three standards that much
be met before it would be comfortable with implementing a biometric
scheme with the ID card. These three standards are that the biometric
technology or technologies in question:
<UL>
<LI> would be sufficiently mature and reliable</LI>
<LI> could be implemented at a cost which justified the benefits</LI>
<LI>were acceptable to members of the public</LI>
</UL>
We feel that none of these conditions could be met, now or in the
foreseeable future.
<P>
For more information, take a look at
<A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20020518124038/http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#5">Bruce Schneier's coverage</A> of
gummi fingerprints or the <A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20040309180249/http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/drawing_blank.pdf">ACLU's report</A> (PDF)
on a facial recognition study in Florida.
<P>
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<P>
<A NAME="abuses"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You Care — But You Won't Punish Abuses</div>
We are very disappointed that the government doesn't seem to
consider it necessary to include criminal sanctions for unauthorised
access to or misuse of individuals' data, something that is worryingly
typical of the way in which the Civil Service seems to address issues of
individuals' rights to privacy in the UK.
<P>
We consider that, in order to provide any level of public confidence in
any scheme, there should be far greater punishments of such abuses of the
scheme than there should be for the relatively trivial 'offences' of
forgetting to tell the central government that one has moved house. As
the Home Office was reminded in Summer 2002 with the badly thought-out
Standing Order to extend RIP Act section 22 powers, there are many cases
where state officials with access to sensitive data about citizens have
abused that power.
<P>
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<P>
<A NAME="mandate"></A>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You've Got A Mandate — But Not From Me You Ain't</div>
ID Cards are one of those ideas
that the public never votes on, but governments always
propose. There is no mention of them in the
<A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20021020001937/http://www.labour.org.uk/generalelectionmanifesto/">Labour Party's manifesto</A>.
<P>
But it's OK.
<P>
You will not be required to use a card unless you wish to work, use the banking or health system,
vote, buy a house, drive, travel or receive benefits.<P>
As Mr Blunkett advised Parliament: "The issuing of a card does not force
anyone to use it, although in terms of drivers or passport users,
or if services — whether public or private — required some proof of
identity before expenditure was laid out, without proof of identity and
therefore entitlement to do it I doubt whether non-use of it would last very long."
<P>
Of course, if enough people refused to use the cards they would lose their raison d'être.<P>
Just not using the card is an option.<p>
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