You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
-[OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide](https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-security-testing-guide/)
139
-
-[Security Testing Guidelines for Mobile Apps](https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Security_Testing_Guidelines_for_mobile_Apps_-_Florian_Stahl+Johannes_Stroeher.pdf)
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/04-Testing_for_HTTP_Parameter_Pollution.md
+3-3Lines changed: 3 additions & 3 deletions
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ In 2009, immediately after the publication of the first research on HTTP Paramet
29
29
30
30
One of these flaws, affecting *ModSecurity SQL Injection Core Rules*, represents a perfect example of the impedance mismatch between applications and filters. The ModSecurity filter would correctly apply a deny list for the following string: `select 1,2,3 from table`, thus blocking this example URL from being processed by the web server: `/index.aspx?page=select 1,2,3 from table`. However, by exploiting the concatenation of multiple HTTP parameters, an attacker could cause the application server to concatenate the string after the ModSecurity filter already accepted the input. As an example, the URL `/index.aspx?page=select 1&page=2,3` from table would not trigger the ModSecurity filter, yet the application layer would concatenate the input back into the full malicious string.
31
31
32
-
Another HPP vulnerability turned out to affect *Apple Cups*, the well-known printing system used by many UNIX systems. Exploiting HPP, an attacker could easily trigger a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability using the following URL: `https://127.0.0.1:631/admin/?kerberos=onmouseover=alert(1)&kerberos`. The application validation checkpoint could be bypassed by adding an extra `kerberos` argument having a valid string (e.g. empty string). As the validation checkpoint would only consider the second occurrence, the first `kerberos` parameter was not properly sanitized before being used to generate dynamic HTML content. Successful exploitation would result in JavaScript code execution under the context of the hosting site.
32
+
Another HPP vulnerability turned out to affect *Apple Cups*, the well-known printing system used by many Unix systems. Exploiting HPP, an attacker could easily trigger a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability using the following URL: `https://127.0.0.1:631/admin/?kerberos=onmouseover=alert(1)&kerberos`. The application validation checkpoint could be bypassed by adding an extra `kerberos` argument having a valid string (e.g. empty string). As the validation checkpoint would only consider the second occurrence, the first `kerberos` parameter was not properly sanitized before being used to generate dynamic HTML content. Successful exploitation would result in JavaScript code execution under the context of the hosting site.
33
33
34
34
### Authentication Bypass
35
35
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Given the URL and querystring: `https://example.com/?color=red&color=blue`
69
69
| mod_wsgi (Python) / Apache | First occurrence only | color=red |
70
70
| Python / Zope | All occurrences in List data type | color=['red','blue']|
71
71
72
-
(source: [Appsec EU 2009 Carettoni & Paola](https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/AppsecEU09_CarettoniDiPaola_v0.8.pdf))
72
+
(Source: Appsec EU 2009 Carettoni & Paola)
73
73
74
74
## Test Objectives
75
75
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ In particular, pay attention to responses having HPP vectors within `data`, `src
139
139
140
140
### Whitepapers
141
141
142
-
-[HTTP Parameter Pollution - Luca Carettoni, Stefano di Paola](https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/AppsecEU09_CarettoniDiPaola_v0.8.pdf)
142
+
-[HTTP Parameter Pollution - Luca Carettoni, Stefano di Paola](https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/HTTP-Parameter-Pollution-WhitePaper.pdf)
143
143
-[Client-side HTTP Parameter Pollution Example (Yahoo! Classic Mail flaw) - Stefano di Paola](https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2009/05/client-side-http-parameter-pollution.html)
144
144
-[How to Detect HTTP Parameter Pollution Attacks - Chrysostomos Daniel](https://www.acunetix.com/blog/whitepaper-http-parameter-pollution/)
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/18-Testing_for_Server-side_Template_Injection.md
+1-2Lines changed: 1 addition & 2 deletions
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ The tester can also identify what other objects, methods and properties can be e
129
129
-[James Kettle: Server-Side Template Injection:RCE for the modern webapp (whitepaper)](https://portswigger.net/kb/papers/serversidetemplateinjection.pdf)
-[Exploring SSTI in Flask/Jinja2](https://www.lanmaster53.com/2016/03/exploring-ssti-flask-jinja2/)
132
-
-[ServerSide Template Injection: from detection to Remote shell](https://www.okiok.com/server-side-template-injection-from-detection-to-remote-shell/)
132
+
-[Server-Side Template Injection: from detection to Remote shell](https://www.okiok.com/server-side-template-injection-from-detection-to-remote-shell/)
133
133
-[Extreme Vulnerable Web Application](https://github.com/s4n7h0/xvwa)
134
-
-[Divine Selorm Tsa: Exploiting server side template injection with tplmap](https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Owasp_SSTI_final.pdf)
135
134
-[Exploiting SSTI in Thymeleaf](https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/exploiting-ssti-in-thymeleaf/)
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/10-Business_Logic_Testing/07-Test_Defenses_Against_Application_Misuse.md
-1Lines changed: 0 additions & 1 deletion
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -90,5 +90,4 @@ Applications should implement active defenses to fend off attackers and abusers.
90
90
-[IR 7684](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/7864/final) Common Misuse Scoring System (CMSS), NIST
91
91
-[Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification](https://capec.mitre.org/) (CAPEC), The Mitre Corporation
0 commit comments